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PREFACE;-
This research focused on the Legal Structure of the 
Arab League, dealt with some of the institutional aspects 
of this regional organisation and assessed its achievements 
and failures in the light of both its objectives as they 
are formulated in its constituent instrument and the 
existing reality of the divers ideological, political and 
economic policies of its member states.
It is profoundly hoped that this research will be of 
interest to international lawyers, historians and political 
scientists, and will generally contribute to a better 
understanding of the field of the Law of International 
Institutions, This dissertation constitutes the second 
requirement for the degree of LL.M. in Public International 
Law at the University of Glasgow* The first requirement 
for obtaining this degree comprises of a course in the 
following subjects;-
(1) The Law of International Institutions;
(2) The International Law or the Sea;
(3) Maritime Law;
in all of v/hich one must satisfy the examiners at a level, 
at least equivalent, to a second grade honours degree, 
before being allowed to proceed to submit a dissertation 
in satisfaction of the above mentioned second requirement.
The method adopted in dealing with this study, was 
divided into four main parts:-
(1) Part One dealing with the historical background 
to the establishment of the Arab League, provides some 
description and analysis for the handling of its objectives, 
categories, qualification, criteria, and procedures of 
membership as well as withdrawal, suspension, and expulsion 
of member states as well as its internal structure and organs.
(2) Part two is devoted to the study of the fimction 
of the Arab League in the economic, the social, the cultural, 
the scientific, the technical, the military, and the 
political spheres, as well as the machinery and procedures 
adopted for the settlement of disputes between its member 
states. The Lebanese Civil War and the Problem of the 
Western Sahara are considered as examples of inter-member 
disputes, and the Palestine Problem as well as the various 
aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict are briefly analysed. 
New developments that have taken place, and the role of
the Arab League as a regional system reaching to external 
threats, rather than its role as an institution for the 
peaceful settlement of internal disputes are discussed.
(3) Part three deals with the relationship between 
the Arab League and other international and regional 
organisation. More specifically, however, it analyses 
the relationship with the United Nations, the U.N. 
Specialised Agencies, the Organisation of African Unity, 
and the European Economic Community.
{a ) Part four examines and assesses the success, 
and failure of the Arab League as well as its possible 
future role•
In preparation of this study, I wish to express my 
sincere gratitude and appreciation to my Supervisor,
Mr. John P. Grant, of Glasgow University, for his helpful 
guidance, and inspiring suggestions throughout my course 
in the Law of International Institutions, and International 
Law of the Sea, and during my research on this subject.
I also owe a debt of gratitude and appreciation to 
Mrs. A.M. McLean, Mr* L.W.L. Aitcheson and Mr. R. Sutherland 
of Glasgow University, for their assistance and guidance 
throughout my course in Maritime Law.
I am deeply beholden to my close friend, A. Sir.ton, for 
criticism, suggestions and patient reading of my manuscript.
He offered me innumerable valuable comments on contents, 
structure and style.
None of them, however, is responsible for any errors 
contained in this v^ ork for which I take sole responsibility.
I also owe a very special debt of gratitude to my wife 
Laila and my daughter Magdalene, special thanks for their 
patience and encouragement throughout my study.
I owe thanks to the Staff of Glasgow University Library 
for their assistance and co-operation. I am grateful to 
Mrs. A. Black v/ho kindly typed the manuscript.
Finally, I should like to acknowledge the intellectual 
debt I owe to my maternal grandmother who above all, 
taught me at an early age to learn from my social environment
In the conclusion of this preface, I must emphasise 
that the opinions and views expressed in this study are 
entirely my own, and should not necessarily be taken to 
represent the views of the Arab League or those of the 
persons, and institutions to whom tribute has been paid.
Glasgow - March 1979« Omar A. Bakhashab
INTRODUCTION.
HISTORICAL PACKGROUND;-
Nationalism developed rapidly in the Arab World in 
the 19th Century having gained its initial impact, 
undoubtedly, from contacts with Europe. The first move­
ment was started by Muhammed Ali's opposition to Turkish 
authority, and separated Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. 
While Muhammed Ali' s movement was more an ambitious 
personal dream of establishing an Arabian Empire, 
encompassing the whole Arab World, than a national move­
ment, it actually met active opposition, particularly in 
the Levant, Iraq and Arabian Peninsula, thus stoking 
additional national fires.^^^
Simultaneously, the Wahhabite movement developed, 
spreading through the Central Arabian Peninsula, having 
as its aim to restore the Arabs to Islamic purity. This 
movement was, however, temporarily blocked by Turko- 
Eg3q)tian action under Muhammed Ali's direction in I8I8 .
The imposition of a constitution on the Ottoman 
Empire in 1908 raised Arab hopes of a new era of freedom, 
but unfortunately, it was not long, before they realised 
that as long as they remained part of the Ottoman Empire 
they had few chances of gaining freedom and development. 
Due to the character of Ottoman rule, Arab nationalism 
had to resort to secret societies to spread its ideals 
throughout the Arab World. The object of these societies 
was to v/ork together for Arab independence, and the 
liberation of the Arab countries from the Turkish, and 
all other kind of foreign domination.
(1) Seton “ William M-V. Britain and the Arab States, 
Luzac and Company Ltd., London, 1948. p*16.
A Pan“Arab Congress was held in Paris in 1913, at which
demands for full rights for the Arabs were voiced, but
despite the obvious disintegration of the Ottoman
administration, the Arab cause made no substantial 
(2)progress. ^
For the most part, the Turks ruthlessly put down 
any sign of incipient Arab nationalism, generally by 
deportations and executions. It was this harsh policy 
that drove the Arabs to revolt against Turkish authority. 
Early in 1914 Sharif Hussein of Mecca approached the 
British High Commissioner in Egypt to find out the British 
attitude toward hn Arab revolt against the Turks. At that 
time, however, British policy was based on preserving the 
Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russian expansion.
This traditional British policy was subsequently abandoned 
in consequence of Turkey' s entry into the War on the 
German side .^  ^
Under these circumstances, the correspondence between 
Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry MacMahon, the 
British High Commissioner in Cairo was re-opened, and the 
British Government promised the Arabs support in their 
struggle for unity and independence
By the end of the First World War, Arab aspirations 
for unification into one nation, were expressed in a 
memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris, 
by Amir. Faisal, the Sharif's son, which defined the Arabs 
as those people of Semitic stock, speaking Arabic.
(2) Seton“Williain M.V. Op.cit. pp.12-15*
(3) Bullard Reader, the Middle East, Oxford University-Press, 
London, 1958* p.12.
(4) Goma-a Ahamed M. The Foundation of the League of Arab 
States, Longman Groups Ltd., London 1977, p*!#
(5) Goma-a Ahamed M. Op.cit* p.5*
The Peace Conference decided that the Arab provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire, would be wholly separated from Turkey 
and temporarily placed under mandatory administration of 
Britain and Prance, entrusted to lead them toward complete 
independence, subject to the implementation of the Balfour 
Declaration.
Following the War, Great Britain was confronted by its 
va,riou8 conflicting pledges which led to confusing situations 
in the Arab World;
(1) First, there was the Hussein-MacMahon 
agreement by which the British Government 
promised the Arabs to support their 
struggle for unity and independence ;
(2) Second, there was the Balfour Declaration 
by which the British Government promised 
the Jews to establish a National Home for 
them in Palestine;
(3) Third, there was the Mandates System under 
which the Peace Conference decided to place 
the Arab countries, which was a far cry from 
complete independence ;
(4) Finally, there was the 1920 San Remo agree­
ment which allocated the mandate over Syria
and Lebanon to France and Palestine, Iraq
( 1)and Trans-Jordan to Great Britain.' '
As a result, the Arabs rose in revolt against Britain 
and France for breaking their promises to Arab nationalism 
whose main object wash) re-unify the Arab countries under 
an independent political regime. In consequence of the 
San Remo settlement the Arab independence movement re­
grouped, adapting itself to the conditions prevailing in 
the different territories. Thus it emerged that Arabia 
withdrew into relative isolation and independence ; Iraq 
found itself semi-independent under British tutelage;
(6) Bullard Reader Op.cit. pp.12-16. .
(7) Fhadduri M* the Arab League as a Regional Arrangement
A.J.I.L. Volume 40, 1946. pp.761-766.
Syria and Lebanon were under indirect French rule and
Palestine was under direct British rule, with a Jewish
National Home within its frontiers. As has already been
mentioned, Egypt had been detached from the Ottoman
Empire in the 19th Century, and had developed first under
Muhammed Ali, and subsequently under British occupation.
Thus the emergence of separate Arab independence movements
in the various territories accentuated the latent tendencies
toward disunity.^
The Arab territories placed under the Mandates System
were definitely dissatisfied with the political status
imposed upon them, and it was natural in the circumstances,
to concentrate on the immediate goal of independence as
a first step toward unity
The political progress made by some mandated territories
and the need to conciliate Arab opinion forced Britain to
grant independence to Iraq in 1932 and to Egypt in 1936*^^^'
The outbreak of the Second World War, the establishment
of a British Command for the Middle East in Cairo, and the
need for Britain to conciliate Arab opinion, embittered by
developments in Palestine gave renewed advantages to the
(11)endeavours for Arab unity.' *
In a speech delivered by Mr. Anthony Eden, the Foreign
Secretary, in May 1941 at the House of Commons, he said
that "...the British Government would give support to any
scheme that commanded general approval among Arabs for
strengthening the cultural, economic, and political ties
( 12)between the Arab countries.”' ^
(.8) Latham Edward, Crisis in the Middle East, the A.W.
Wilson Company, New York 1952, p .155.
(9) Goma-a Ahamed M. Op.cit. p.5*
(10) Bullard Reader Op.cit. p.20.
(11) Latham Edward, Op * cit. p .157.
(12) Ibid Op.cit. p.25.
Under these circumstances, Nuri-es-Said Pasha 
Prime Minister of Iraq put forward in 1942, a scheme 
for the unification of Syria, Lebanon, ïrans-Jordan 
and Palestine, with semi-autonomy for the Jews in 
Palestine, which would be linked with Iraq by a federal 
agreement, the whole constituting a Fertile Crescent 
U n i o n ^  This plan was rejected as a matter of course, 
mainly because of Egyptian fears that the rise of a 
large, united state in Northern Arabia would threaten 
her position of pre-eminence, while Saudi Arabia v/as 
definitely opposed to any kind of unification under the 
aegis of the rival Hashemite family. Furthermore, Syria 
and Lebanon preferred to maintain their republican 
oligarchy rather than submerge themselves into a larger 
Kingdom.
Subsequently Mr. Eden re-iterated British support
for a plan of Arab unity, but added that any initiative
would have to come from the Arabs themselves
The initiative for such a scheme of Arab unity
came eventually, from the Egyptians, whose Prime Minister
Nahas Pasha presented tentative proposals for an organis-
(15)ation of Arab unity to the Egyptian Parliament in 1943.
It would appear that Nahas Pasha was motivated by the 
consideration that an Egyptian dominated kind of Arab 
Union might aid Egypt in achieving its national aspirations 
Subsequently, Nahas Pasha held a number of bilateral 
consultations with high level representatives of the 
governments of each of the sovereign Arab states in Cairo, 
to call attention to his concept of a loose League of 
sovereign Arab states. Nevertheless some Arab states were 
very reluctant to commit themselves to any scheme of 
Arab u n i t y . A t  any event, the seven sovereign Arab
(13) Bullard Reader Op.cit* p .25.
(14) Lenczowski George, The Middle East in World Affairs, 
Cornell University Press, New York, 1962, p .633 #
(15) Khadduri M. Op.cit. pp.756-761.
(16) Lenczowski George Op.cit. pp.633-637.
(17)States^ ^ signed a protocol in Alexandria on October 
7th, 1944 at which they undertook to establish an Arab 
League in the near future.
Subsequently, v/hen the Arab League came into 
being on the conclusion of the Pact in Cairo, on March 
22nd, 1945, it became however clear, that the League 
was an even looser association than had been contemplated 
in Alexandria. The Pact laid great stress on the sovereignty 
of individual member States as a direct result of their 
reluctance to commit themselves to any scheme of Arab unity. 
Nevertheless the Pact provided for machinery composed of 
a Council, introduced the principle of unanimity, the 
requirement of voluntary co-operation and consultation
(17) Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kingdom of Yemen, 
Lebanon and Trans-Jordan.
(18) The Alexandria Protocol, Published by the Arab 
League, Cairo N.D. pd.
(19) Lenczowski George Op.cit. pp.637-638.
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE:-
The objectives of the Arab League as stated in the 
preamble of the Alexandria Protocol introduced the 
conditions which were to bind all Arab countries and 
direct them to strive toward the welfare of the Arab 
world, to improve its conditions, ensure its future and 
realize its hopes and aspirations. The objectives of the 
Arab League were also to include the supervision of the 
implementation of the agreements concluded between member 
States, the holding of periodic meetings with the intent 
of strengthening the relations between those States, to 
co-ordinate their political plans so as to ensure their 
co-operation and to protect their independence and 
sovereignty against any aggression, with all suitable 
means, and to supervise in a general way the affairs and 
interests of the Arab countries.
The Pact of the Arab League stressed Arab unity and 
created a regional, political organisation aimed to foster 
co-operation between the member S t a t e s . A r t i c l e  2 
of the Pact defines the Arab League's purposes as the 
strengthening of the relation between the member States, 
the co-operation between them and the safeguarding of 
their political independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and a general concern with the affairs and 
interest of the Arab c o u n t r i e s T h e  Pact emphasises 
specifically economic end financial affairs, commercial 
exchange, customs, currency, agricultural, industrial, 
communications . and cultural matters, questions of 
nationality and social and health affairs.
(1) Hassouna H. The League of the Arab States and 
Regional Disputes, Unpublished PH.D. Dissertation, 
Cambridge Univ* 1969 p*].
(2) Lenczowski Go, The Middle East in World Affairs 
Cornell Univ. Press, third edition. New York 1962 
pp.637-638 o
THE PROCEDURES OF filSMBERSHIP;-
Article 1 of the Pact provides that the League 
of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab 
States which have signed this Pact. "Any independent 
Arab State has the right to become a member of the 
Arab League if it desires to do so.”' Thus membership 
in the Arab League is obviously open to independent 
Arab States and such States have the ri^ht to become 
members of the League of Arab S t a t e s . T h e r e  are two 
kinds of membership,, original members and admitted members*. 
The original members, as stated in Article 1 of the Pact 
of the Arab League, are the signatories of the Alexandria 
Protocol and of the Pact.
In accordance with Article 1 subsequent members are 
those of the Arab States v/hich were admitted to membership 
of the Arab League after obtaining their political in­
dependence and after fulfilling the requirements laid 
down'in the Article, thus obtaining the right to become 
members of the Arab League.
Any independent Arab State seeking admission to 
membership of the League can submit a request which shall 
be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General, 
who shall submit it to the League Council at its next 
meeting. ' ^
In conformity with Article 1 thirteen Arab States 
have joined the Pact of the Arab League.
(.3) The Pact of the Arab League, Article 1.
(4) Hassouna H. op.cito, po8o
(5) Moussa Ahmad, En Marge du Membership dans la Ligue
Arabe (en arabe): société Egyptienne du Droit
International, Volume 11, 1970. pp.57-73 (Arabie text)
(6) Sudan 19.1.1956. Libya 28.3.1953, Tunis 1.10.1958, 
Morocco 1.10.1958, Kuwait 20.7.1961, Algeria 16.8.1962, 
Southern Yemen 12.12.1967, Oman and Mascot 29.9.1971, 
Behrain 11.1*1971, Qater 11.9.1971. United Arab Emerites 
6.12.1971, Somalia 14.2.1974, Mcritania 26.11.1973 and 
Dijabouti 1977.
THE CONDITIONS OF ADMSSION;-
Article 1 of the Pact requires that the League of 
Arab States consist only of independent Arab States, 
the States which signed the Pact and any independent 
Arab State willing to join. In principle such a State 
has the right to become a member of the Arab League*^^)
Basically, the membership in the Arab League is 
subject to the simultaneous satisfaction of two conditions 
which shall be discussed separately, namely that:-
(1) it must be an Arab State,
(,2) it must be an independent State.
The competence of the Council of the Arab League concerning 
admission is limited to the verification of the satisfaction 
of the two conditions whereafter it is mandatory on the 
Council to decide to admit such a State.
^  Discussion of the first condition, i.e. of what 
constitutes Arabism, requires a brief historical review.
The Arabian Peninsula nursed the Semitic Family,
those peoples v/ho later migrated into the Fertile Crescent
and subsequently became the Babylonians, the Assyrians,
the Phoenicians and the Hebrews. In medieval times Arabia
gave birth to people who conquered most of the civilized
world, and to the religion of Islam, which still claims,
the adherence of some four hundred and thirty million
people, representing nearly all the races and many different
countries. Within a few centuries these people became the
masters of an empire extending from the shores of the
Atlantic Ocean to the borders of China. It was not only
an empire that the Arabs built, but a culture as well.
The Arabic language today is the medium of daily expression
(8)for some one hundred and fifty million peoples.' ^
(7) Abdul-Hamid Sami Muhammed. International Regional
Organisations, Alexandria University Press,
Alexandria, Egypt. 1971. p.360 (Arabic text)
(,8) Hitti P.K. The History of the Arabs, MacMillan & Co.,Ltd.
London, 19 64 . p *3•
Originally the Arabs were a nomadic people inhabiting 
the Arabian Peninsula. The present day Saudis, Yemenis, 
Kuwaitis are the descendants of the original inhabitants 
of the Arab heartland. In its most significant and common 
use today the v/ord Arab designates a culture group which 
encompasses all the peoples of the Arab World, and all 
that part of the Middle East and North Africa, in addition 
of course to Arabia itself, which was permanently arabized 
by the Mulsim-Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth 
centuries. The process of arabization was accomplished 
in three principal ways:-
Cl) Racial mixing by intermarriage between 
the Arab Conquerors and the original 
occupants•
(2) The establishment of Arabic Language in 
all the conquered countries.
(3) The conversion of the vast majority of the 
population to Islam.
The Arab World as a bloc of Arabic speaking communities 
stretching continuously from the Arabian Gulf to the 
Atlantic in the West, from Aleppo in the North to beyond 
Khartoum in the South, regard themselves as Arabs. They 
include the inhabitants of the Arabian Gulf principalities, 
the Iraqi, the Yemenis, the Saudi Arabians, the Syrians, 
the Lebanese, the Palestinians, Jordanians, the Egyptians, 
the North Sudanese, the Libyans, the Tunisians, the 
Algerians, and the Moroccans and Mbritanians.^ ^
The word Arab is used here in a sense which may seem 
to be comprehensive since it includes regardless of 
different origin, colour and descent all those who choose 
to be or feel themselves to be A r a b s . T h e  Arabic
(9) Atiyah E. The Arabs. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmonelsworth 
London 1955* pp.7-14.
(10) Berque J . The Arabs. Faber & Faber, London, 1964. p.17.
spealîing peoples have significant characteristics that 
express their identity, a culture drawn from the Islamic 
religion, a social and political system based on tolerance, 
•freedom, democracy and the justice of Islam. Whilst we 
can say that there is no pure Arab race, such as existed 
in the pagan, pre-islamic community, but then there is 
no pure race on earth, due to mixing as a result of wars, 
invasions, immigrations, adventure and trade.
There is the Arab whose quantities form a political 
community as a result of his way of life, including 
particularly the relation between husband and wife, 
father and family. There is also the Arabic language as 
a means of communications. To be an Arab is not confined 
to the Bedouin who lived in the desert of the Arabian 
Peninsula, for the Arab went with his doctrines to the 
neighbouring lands and introduced himself to them through 
his civilization and freedom, and the peoples in the 
neighbouring land attached themselves to these after their 
years of suffering from tyranny and bondage, inflicted by 
the ancient empires*
The Arabic language is an efficient means of communic­
ation among Arabs, and as such it facilitates social 
solidarity and collaboration which can be seen in the 
habit of insisting on living within a cojmmunity in v/hich 
the citizens feel safe and peaceful.
Thus by the term Arab civilization is meant the social 
system in Islam and usage of the Arab language as a medium 
of communication in the Arab community governing it and 
defending its interests.
Extending beyond the Arab peoples there are the Islamic 
Nations which consist of a number of peoples who have 
adopted Islam and the Islamic social syscem while keeping 
their local folklore and language, such as the Moslems 
of India, China, Iran, Pakistan etc.
The Arab population has constituted itself into a 
number of States which have their specific customs, but 
they all submit to one social system and have an apparent 
desire to co-exist with one another. This phenomenon is 
clear enough in the co-operation of about 150 million 
Arabs in initiating, the Arab League by the end of the 
Second World War. The League combines the Arab States 
and peoples who meet together to discuss their problems 
and to draw up optional plans for military, political, 
economic, cultural and social co-operation.
It would appear that adherence to the Arab community 
depends largely on the feeling and desires of the 
population of a given State. Such is the case of Somalia, 
which considers itself an Arab State, even though its 
people do not speak Arabic. In. a move to straighten this 
problem Somalia declared Arabic as one of the official 
languages of the State. There thus co-exists Somali 
using the Latin script, and Arabic with its own alphabet 
and it is one of the League’s endeavours to foster the 
adaptation and adoption of the script in order to promote 
the intellectual unity of the various Arab countries by 
means of education, culture and science.
The delay in admitting Mauretania to membership 
of the Arab League had nothing to do with Arabism, but was 
caused by the Moroccan opposition to the admission, because 
Morocco considered Mauretania a part of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, whilst admitting that Mauretania is a part of 
the Arab World. In consequence of settling the outstanding 
dispute between the two neighbouring states, Morocco 
recognised Mauretanian sovereignty as an independent Arab 
State. In the light of this settlement Mauretania was 
admitted to membership of the Arab League on 26th November, 
1973.
(ll) Lr. El-Emary Ahmed Saleem, The Essence of the Arab 
peoples and the Arab League, The Egyptian Political 
Science Review, Special Issue on the Arab League, 
Cairo - March 1972. pp .15-22.
The Second Condition “It must he an independent 
Arab State". Here the operative term is ’independent'.
Under International Lav/, the concept of independence and 
sovereignty is a major feature in relation to other States 
and to international organisations of States. The principle 
of independence of States includes;-
(.1) Exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and 
the permanent population living there.
(2) The duty of non-intervention in the area of 
exclusive jurisdiction of other ( sovereign 
and independent) States.,
(3 ) Compliance with obligations arising from
International customary law, e.g. treaties,
(12;conventions, agreements etc. ^
The concept of independence therefore that a State 
has sovereignty over its territory and sovereignty is 
generally taken as comprising dominium, the ownership 
of land and imperium, the exercise of governmental 
• power
Article 1 of the Pact of the Arab League provides 
that the League of Arab States is composed of the in­
dependent Arab States which have signed this Pact. 
Furthermore Article 1 provides that membership is open 
to all independent Arab States. As was mentioned above 
the original signatories of the Pact constituting the 
Arab League were Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Other Arab States could 
join it on attainment of formal independence, where they 
shall submit a request which shall be deposited with the 
Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the 
Council at the first meeting held after submission of 
the request.
(12) Brov/nlie I* Principles of International Lav/,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973 « pp.280-281.
(13) Grant J.P. Oil and Gas Law. University of Dundee,
1975. p. A-201.
It is to be noted, however, that some of the 
original members were independent in name only, and in 
the case of Trans-Jordan not independent at all, being 
legally still a Mandate. The independence of Syria and 
Lebanon had been recognised by the U.N . including France 
the former mandatory power. Moreover, Syi-ia and Lebanon 
signed the U.N. Declaration of January 1st, 1942 and 
the U.N. Charter of June 26th, 1945 and vt/ere represented 
in this World Organisation•
The case of Palestine and Trans-Jordan was treated 
differently. Both Palestine and Trans-Jordan were con­
sidered as one territory under the Mandates System, and 
Great Britain the mandatory power was responsible for 
the administration to the League of Nations or to the 
U.N. in accordance with Article 77 of the U.N. Charter.
therefore, lacked full independence, one of 
the conditions of membership in the Arab League. Palestine 
was not a signatory to the Arab Pact and is not a member 
.of the Arab League. Its representatives attended the 
Alexandria conference only as observers, but declared 
that Palestine was a trust of the Arab countries* Trans- 
Jordan under the Mandatory System could in effect be 
declared a trust territory under Article 77 of the U.N. 
Charter, thus lacking formal independence as required 
by the Arab League Pact, but since the Arab countries 
had never recognised the Mandates System it was decided 
accordingly to regard Trans-Jordan as an independent 
Arab State.
In connection with the Kuwaiti situation, the 
latter gained its independence in accordance wit^ . the 
1961 agreement reached between Great Britain and Kuwait. 
Under this treaty Kuwait took over its own defence and
(14) Khadduri Majid. The Arab League as a Regional 
Arrangement, American Journal of International 
Law, Volume 40, 1946. pp.766-768.
the conduct of its foreign affairs. The agreement further 
stipulated British assistance to Kuwait at the request of 
the latter. Within a week of the declaration of independence 
Iraq's President Ahd-Al-Karim Qasim claimed Kuwait as 
a part of the Province of Basrah. Qasim claimed preference 
for the use of peaceful means, hut he threatened to use 
armed force to gain his ends. Kuwait called for Arab support 
but got cautious answers from all Arab States, except Saudi 
Arabia, who at once sent their Chief of Staff to Kuwait.
In the light of the cautious response of all Arab States, 
the Ruler of Kuwait called for British assistance in 
accordance with the 1961 agreement of mutual co-operation 
and assistance. As a result British troops landed in
(15)Kuwait and deployed along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontier*' *
On 5th June 1961 the League Council met to discuss 
Kuwait's request to adhere to the League Pact as a member 
of the Arab League. The Council decided to admit Kuwait 
in spite of Iraqi o p p o s i t i o n I n  the voting on the 
admission of Kuwait, the Council did not count the Iraqi 
vote in accordance with the provisions of Article 6(2) 
of the Pact which states that the Council shall by un­
animous decision determine the measures necessary to 
repulse the aggression and if the aggressor is a member 
State 5 the vote of this member State shall not be counted 
in determining unanimity. The admission of a new Arab 
State to membership of the Arab League shall be determined 
in accordance with Article 7 of the Pact, That means the 
voting procedures for the Council makes unanimity the 
general rule. In connection with the League Council 
competence regarding admission of a newly independent 
Arab State, such competence is limited to the verification
(15) Monroe Elizabeth, Kuv/ait and Aden a contrast in 
British Policies, The Middle Bast Journal, Volume 18, 
1964, pp.63-67.
(16) Moassa Ahmed, Op.cit* pp.57-73.
that the tv/o mentioned conditions are satisfied.
It is to be noted that the Iraqi representative 
boycotted the meeting of the League Council. In a move 
to break the deadlock caused by the Iraqi boycott of 
the meeting of the League Council, the latter adopted 
a procedure similar to the procedure that was adopted 
by the U.h. Security Council in connection with the 
Korean situation.
VOTING PRQCEIIUHES;-
Article 1 (2) of the Pact of the Arab League provides 
that any independent Arab State has the right to become 
a member of the League. If it desires to do so, it shall 
submit a request which will be deposited with the Permanent 
Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the 
first meeting held after submission of the request. The 
decision of the League Council regarding the admission to 
the membership of the League shall be taken by unanimous 
vote of all member States of the League of the Arab States.
The customary rule of abstention which originated in 
the procedure of the U.N. Security Council has been taken 
over in the procedure of the League Council. Thus while a 
decision of the League Council regarding the admission 
of a new independent Arab state, shall be taken by unanimous 
vote, abstention of a member State is considered a voluntary
(,17) U.N. forces had been established in Korea by the
Resolution of the Security Council of June 25th and 
27th, 1950, under the Uniting for Peace Resolutions, 
which were adopted by the U.N. Security Council, 
during the absence of Mr. Malik, the Russian 
representative. The two resolutions were opposed 
by Soviet Union as being in breach of Article 27 (3) 
which requires the concurring votes of the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council.
act not constituting a ban to the adoption of the 
d e c i s i o n . P o r  instance, Saudi Arabia abstained in 
the voting on the admission of Southern Yemen and the 
latter was admitted in spite of non-recognition of this 
Republic by Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation which is not a sovereign, has 
full membership owing to the special situation and there­
fore its representatives participate in any meeting at 
any level. On the other hand non-independent Arab States 
had been admitted with observer status. Moreover, 
representatives of non-member Arab countries had only 
been allowed, to take part in the work of the technical 
committees.
THE TERMINATION OP THE MEMBERSHIP:-
Article 18 of the Pact provides that if a member 
State intends to withdraw from the League, it shall inform 
the Council of its intention one year before such with­
drawal shall take effect. The withdrawal from international 
organisation is the faculty of any sovereign State, in 
accordance with the customary rule of International Law 
relating to membership in international organisations 
consisting of savareign states.
Article IB (2) of the Pact provides further that the 
Council of the League may consider any State which fails 
to fulfil its obligations under the Pact as having become 
separated from the League, in conformity with the provisions 
of this Article. The Council shall adopt a unanimous 
decision of all members to this effect not counting the 
vote of the State concerned.
If a member State loses its international personality 
in consequence of incorporating into another member State
Cl8) Greig Dr.V., International Law, Hutterworths, London 
1976, pp.709-711.
of the Arab League, that member State shall loose its 
membership e.g. both Syria and Egypt, during the union 
from 1958 to 1961, lost their membership and the United 
Arab Republic took the seat of those two States.
As mentioned above the withdrawal from the League 
of the Arab State is voluntary and takes effect one year 
after the notification of intent has been deposited with 
the Council of the League. A member State may withdraw 
without due notification if it objects to an amendment 
to the Pact passed by a two-thirds majority of the member
States.(20)
EXPOLSIOHi-
Article 18 (2) of the Pact provides that the League 
Council may consider any member State which fails to 
fulfil its obligations under the Pact as having broken 
away from the League. In conformity with the provisions 
of Article 18 expulsion of such a State also requires a 
unanimous decision of the Council of all member States 
of the League without counting the vote of the concerned 
State.(
SUSPENSION ;-
There is no express provision in the Pact of the 
Arab League on suspension of a member State. Nevertheless 
it would appear implicit that the League Council may 
adopt measures against any member State that violates its 
obligations under the Pact toward the League or any 
member State. That may involve loss of the right to 
the privileges and immunities of membership. Therefore
(19) Abdul-Hamid Sami, Muhammed, OpoCit., pp.360-362.
(20)Khadduri Majid, Op.Cit., p*767.
C21) Abdul Hamid Sami Muhammed, Op.Cit. p.361.
it will involve the deprivation of a member's represent­
ation as well as his vote in any organs of the League.
The suspension shall be effected by unanimous decision of
( 22)the League Council.^ ^
In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Pact the 
Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures 
necessary to repulse the aggression and if the aggressor 
is a member State his vote shall not be counted in 
determining unanimity.
On the other hand there are recent examples showing 
that the lack of clear cut provisions may give rise to 
difficulties within the League.
On the 24th June 1978 the President of North Yemen 
was assassinated in his official residence in Sana~a.
The government of North Yemen accused the government of 
Southern Yémen of having engineered the assassination and 
requested an emergency meeting at the League Headquarters 
in Cairo. Most member States acceded to the request and 
their Foreign Ministers met at an emergency session.
The session was however, boycotted by Syria, Iraq, Libya 
and Algeria in addition to Southern Yemen. At the emergency 
meeting the representatives of North Yemen presented 
documentations incriminating the Aden government, and 
the meeting decided, on the basis of the evidence pre­
sented, to take economic and political measures against 
Southern Yemen. In order however to prevent a confrontation
within the League, the implementation of the decision was
( 21 )declared discretionary and optional.'-
(22) Algha&my Talat Muhammed, The United Nations and the 
Specialised Agencies, Atlas Press Cairo, Volume 2,
1974. pp .1016-1018.
(23) Saudi Gazette, No.675, Sunday July 2nd, 1978.
THE INTEMAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE.
THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE;-
Article 3 of the Pact provides that the League
shall possess a Council composed of the representatives
of all member States of the League. Each State shaJ.1
have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its
representatives. The Pact does not specify the number
of representatives that shall be sent nor does it determine
the rank of their appointment in their respective countries.
The Council as the supreme organ is entrusted to choose
an Arab representative from Palestine having the right
to attend the meeting, deliberations of the Council and
to participate in the discussion without a vote. The
Council meets in ordinary session twice a year, but
may be convened in emergency session at the request of
two members.^^^^
The Council shall be convened in Cairo, where the
Headquarters of the League are situated; it may, however,
assemble at any other place it may designate, within
its jurisdiction (Act 10).
According to Article 11 of the internal Regulations
of the League, the meeting of the League Council shall
be considered legal if the majority of member states
( 25)of the Arab League attended such a meeting.' ^
Article ]5 of the Pact provides that the first meeting 
shall be convened at the invitation of the Head of the 
Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at 
the invitation of the Secretary-General. The representatives 
of the member States of the League shall alternately 
assume the Presidency of the Council at each of its 
ordinary sessions.
(24) Hassouna H. Op.Cit. p.6.
(25) Abdul Hamid Sami Muhammed, Op .Git. p.369 .
FUNCTION AND FOYERS OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL;-
The purposes of the Arab League as stated in the
Pact are to realize the common interests and aspirations
of its member States, to promote closer collaboration
among them and to safeguard their independence and
sovereignty. Since at the time of the foundation of the
League a number of Arab countries had not yet won their
independence and were not eligible for membership, the
League extended its scope of interests to consider in
a general way the affairs and interest of those Arab
countries. The Council shall mediate in any dispute which
may lead to a war between two member States or between
a member State and another State in order to conciliate
them. Decisions relating to arbitration and mediation
shall be taken by a majority vote.^^^^ In case of
aggression or a threat of aggression, the member States
may request an immediate meeting of the League Council,
which shall decide by a unanimous vote upon the measures
to be taken against the aggressor. If that aggressor were
a member State of the League, the vote of such a state
shall not be considered in determining the unanimity
( 27)required in voting upon such a matter.'
The Council of the League is entrusted to carry out 
the objectives of the League regarding the strengthening 
of relations between its member States, co-ordination 
of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between 
them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty 
and in a general v/ay concern itself with the affairs and 
interests of the Arab countries and to promote closer 
co-operation on the following matters:-
(26) Ehaddujri Majid Op .Git, pp.766-769*
(27) Article 6 of the Pact of the Arab League.
(a) Economic, financial affairs, including 
commercial relations, customs, currency, 
questions of agriculture and industry.
(b) Communications, this includes railroads, 
road, aviation, navigation, telegraphs 
and posts.
(\c) Cultuf-:;al affairs.
(d) Nationality, passport, visas.
The Council’s task is also to decide upon the means 
through which the League is to co-operate with International 
Organisations to be established in future, concerned with 
the maintenance of International Peace and Security and 
economic development, in order to co-ordinate, the policies 
of its member States towards such International Institutions.
According to the Pact of the League the scope of 
competence of the League Council also includes the following 
matters:-
(l) The supervision of what is achieved to 
carry out the League's objectives.
(,2) The implementation of any agreements con­
cluded by the member States regarding 
matters within the jurisdiction of the 
League. Y/ithin this competence, the 
Council has the power to set up Special 
Committees for determining the extent of 
co-operation, and to formulate, the terms 
of rules of any agreement to be submitted 
to the Council.
(28) Abul-Eutuh Named Auda, the Arab League System
Egyptian Political Science Review, Special Issue 
on the Arab League, Cairo, 1972, pp.Ill-lit*




(6) The Council shall mediate all differences 
which may threaten to lead to war between 
member States or a third State with a view 
to conciliation.
(7) The League Council shall appoint the Secretary 
General by a two-thirds majority of the member 
States of the League. The Secretary General 
with the approval of the Council shall appoint 
the Assistant Secretaries General and the 
high ranking officials of the League..
(8) The Council shall approve the annual budget 
of the League before the beginning of each 
fiscal year for which the Secretary-General 
has to prepare the draft of each budget.
The Council has the power to apportion the 
share of the expenses to be borne by each 
member State of the League.
(,9) The Council of the League has to establish
administrative regulations for the functioning 
of the Secretariat-General, matters relating 
to the staff and the adjournment of sessions.
C29) Article 3 (3), 5, 6, 12, I3 and 16 of the Pact 
of the Arab League.
THE VOTING PROCEDURES IN THE COUNCIL:-
The League Council is the supreme organs of the 
League of Arab States and is composed of representatives 
of all member States, each State having one vote,^^^)
The Council meets in ordinary session twice a year, but 
may be convened in extraordinary sessions at the request 
of two member States. Invitations to the meeting are 
distributed by the Secretary-General, sessions are pre­
sided over by the representatives of the member State in 
turn /
The voting procedures for the Council makes unanimity 
the general rule. Decisions taken by unanimity are binding 
upon all member States while majority decisions are only 
binding upon those States which have accepted them.
Decisions on measures to repel aggression are taken by 
unanimous vote, but the vote of the aggressor is not 
counted. The latter rule also applies to decisions regarding 
the expulsion of member State from the Arab League.
On the other hand decisions of the Council relating to 
arbitration or mediation and decisions on administrative 
and procedural matters require only a majority vote.
Finally, the appointment of the Secretary-General 
and amendments of the Pact require a two-thirds majority.
Two sessions are held annually in March and September. 
The Council may if necessary hold an extra-ordinary 
session.(
(30) Abdul Hamid Sami M., Op.cit. p.371.
(31) Hassouna H. Op.cito p.6.
(32) Article 5, 7, 16 and 19 of the Pact of the Arab 
League.
(33) Hassouna H. OpoCit. poll.
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES:-
The Technical Committees were set up at the first 
meeting of the Council, for each of the functional areas 
mentioned in Article 2 of the Pact to assist the Council. 
According to Article 4 of the Pact, these Committees 
consist of representatives of the member States, but 
representatives of other Arab countries (non-members) 
may participate in the work of such committees. The 
Council shall determine the conditions under which these 
representatives may be permitted to participate and the 
rules governing such representation and voting. The 
Council is also competent to appoint the Presidents 
of these Committees for a two year term, which may be 
renewed for a further period. The Committees shall be 
convened in secret meetings which shall be held at the 
Headquarters of.the League. Such meetings shall be con­
sidered legal if the majority of representatives of the 
member States have attended it. Recommendations of these 
Committees shall be adopted by the majority of the attend­
ant representatives, and shall be submitted to the Council 
of the League.
The following Committees were set up : -
(,l) The Cultural Committee;-
In charge of following up the cultural activities 
within the general competence of the League, and it also 
co-ordinates the activities of the Secretariat-General 
and the various cultural organisations in the member 
states.
(2) The Economic Committee:-
In charge of economic activities, but was abolished 
in 1953 and replaced by the Economic Council.
(3) The Social Committee:-
In charge of organising co-operation in spheres 
relating to social matters, including family and child
welfare in member States.
(4) The Legal Committee:-
Responsible for studying and formulating all legal 
matters referred to it such as draft agreements, con­
ventions, regulations, decisions, resolutions and 
recommendations•
(5) The Military Committee:-
Responsible'for regulating common defence plans for 
the provision of defence methods and techniques and for 
the preparation of reports within the jurisdiction of the 
League to be submitted to the Common Defence Council.
(6) The Communications Committee:-
In charge of supervising and regulating sea, land, 
and air communications together with weather forecast 
and mail. Each item is dealt with by a sub-committee.
(7) The Arab Oil Exports Committee:-
In charge of studying oil affairs and to prevent 
smuggling of Arab Oil into Israel and for co-ordinating 
oil policies in general.
(8) The Arab Information Committee:-
Responsible for studying information projects for 
suggesting plans and putting into effect such policies 
as shall be laid down by the Council of Information 
Ministers.
(9) The Health Committee;-
In charge of co-ordinating co-operation in health 
matters.
(10) The Human Rights Committee;-
Responsible for studying subjects concerning humanitarian 
matters, particularly the violation of Human Rights in 
member States and in the occupied territories, under 
Israeli control.
In addition to the above mentioned committees a 
Political Committee has been established and often meets
at Foreign Minister level* The Committee adopts 
recommendations which are then drafted as résolut: 
and submitted to the League Council for approval.*
THE COUNCIL OF THE HEADS OF ARAB STATES:-
In consequence of the proposed diversion of the 
tributaries of the Jordan River by Israel in 1963, and 
moreover, the incapacity of the Arab States to take 
concrete military actions to prevent Israel from pursuing 
such diversions, the President of the United Arab Republic 
(.Egypt) invited all the heads of Arab States to an Arab 
summit to discuss the situation and to adopt a unified 
stand against the Israeli action. The meeting v/as held 
in Cairo in January 1964 and declared that the Heads of 
the Arab States agreed to settle all differences between 
the Arab States. They also decided to hold an annual 
meeting at the level of Heads of States. This meeting 
was first held in 1964 in Alexandria and agreed to 
reconvene annually every September. The Council of Heads 
of Arab States set up two Committees;-
Cl) The Control Committee:-
It is composed of the personal representatives of 
the Monarchs and Presidents of the Arab States as well as 
a representative of the Palestinians to the Arab League. 
This Committee is presided over by the Secretary-General 
of the Arab League. It is responsible to carry out the 
decisions of the Council of the Heads of Arab States and 
to report monthly to the Monarchs and Presidents of the 
Arab States in connection with the execution of such 
decisions. The Committee meets monthly.
(2) The Executive Committee:-
It is composed of the Prime Ministers or Deputy 
Premiers of the member States. This Committee meets 
annually in Marcho The Committee is competent to decide
(34) Abul-Futuh Named Anda, Op.Cit. pp.11-114*
on any matter within the competence of the Council of 
the Heads of Arab States during the interval between its 
annual sessions, to carry out the plans which were approved 
by the Council and to prepare proposals and recommendations 
to be presented to the Council of the Heads of Arab States. 
It has also the power to request an emergency meeting of
the Council if in its opinion there is a necessity for
such a meeting,
THE LEGAL IMPLICATION OF THE COmCIL OF THE HEADS OF 
ARAB STATES
Undoubtedly, we are faced with a new organ of the 
Arab League, The meeting of this organ cannot be con­
sidered a meeting of the League Council at the level 
of Heads, of States- This emerges clearly from the 
declarations of the meetings on l?th January, 196,4, 
on 11th September 1964 and on l_7th September 1965 which 
described them as the first, second and third meetings
of the Council of the Heads of Arab States.
Obviously this newly independent organ of the Arab 
League has annual meetings differing from the meetings 
of the League Council. The meeting of the Council of 
the Heads of Arab States is held annually in September 
while the meetings of the League Council are held semi­
annually in March and October. Thus the first meeting of 
monarchs and presidents of Arab States, which constituted 
itself into a permanent council of the Arab League, by 
this act unanimously established a fait accompli
which implied an amendment of the Pact reached by
tcae.
unanimous decision and created a new organ which^superior 
to the League Council in competence and imposed its 
authority on the above mentioned council.
Unfortunately the differences reappeared among the 
Arab States and that led to the suspension of the 
operation of the .Council of the Heads of Arab States. 
These differences arose after the third meeting in 
Casablanca in September 1965, and led to the cancellation 
of the meeting in Algeria in September 1966.
The Council resumed its meeting after the 1967 
war, the first one being held at the beginning of 
September 1967 in Al-Khartoum. This resulted in settling 
the substantial disputes of Yemen between Saudi Arabia
Aec-LsCov-v
and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) , to render
financial and military support to the front line states
and to reconvene the Council at the beginning of April,
but that meeting did not convene for reasons to be
f 15)elaborated further on.' '
THE PERFJ.NENT SECRETARIAT ; -
IS
According to Article 12 this organ/charged with 
administrative functions; it/^comprised, of the Secretary- 
General, Assistant-Secretaries-General and an appropriate 
=«^er- of officials. The Headquarters are located in Cairo, 
the functions and procedures to be used are left to the 
discretion of the League Council which formulated necessary 
administrative regulations
The Secretariat was also designated as the depository 
for copies of treaties and agreements concluded between 
member States or member States and third States (Art. 17 
of the Pact) . The Secretariat consists of nine departments, 
various bureaux including the Boycott Office in Damascus,
(35) Abdul Hamid'Sami M. Op.cit; pp.374-377.
(36) Hassouna H. Op.cit. pp.7-8.
the Arab Narcotics Bureau, the Institute of Advanced
Arab Studies and the Institute of Arab Manuscripts,
( 17)all in Cairo. '
The Secretariat also maintains permanent offices in 
New York, and Geneva for liaison with the U.N. and its 
Specialised Agencies and operates a number of information 
centres in New York, Geneva, Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, 
Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, New Delhi, Peking, Moscow 
and other World Capitals.
STAFF POLICIES;-
The professional staff members in the operating 
departments of the Secretariat are graded according to 
the system-of diplomatic ranks prevailing in the Egyptian 
Foreign office where department heads normally hold the 
rank of Counsellor. Deputy department heads are initially 
secretaries. Staff members often start as second attaches 
and are usually promoted after two years in office to 
first attaches, subsequently promoted through the ranks 
of third, second secretary and eventually to counsellor.
RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL;-
Recruitment of Personnel is always by open competition 
held periodically in all member States and under the 
supervision of the Assistant Secretaries-General. Service 
with the League Secretariat is financially attractive 
since pay in the graded services is higher than the 
Egyptian Foreign Service.
Most of the professional personnel usually leave the 
Arab League Secretariat after they have attained the rank 
of Counsellor and normally return to their own country's
(.37) Macdonald R.W., The League of Arab States, Princeton
Univ. Press., Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p.124.
Foreign Service. Furthermore, many of the staff members 
in the past have been seconded to the League from the 
Foreign Services of the member States. There is no 
pension system, but a fund is in effect, 7 *5^  of each 
month's pay is deducted and matched by an equal amount 
contributed from the Arab League Fund. The total amount 
is available to the staff member when he leaves the 
services of the Secretariat. Eventually, a severance 
pay has also been provided, paid at the rate of one 
month's pay for each year of services, based on the 
pay of the highest grade attained. One of the problems 
is that the League Secretariat personnel are predominantly 
Egyptian
SECRETARIAT FUNGTIONS;-
The Secretariat consists of the following departments;-
(1) The Secretariat Department;-
This Department is responsible for arranging and 
organising the meetings of the League Council and of 
the Political Committee, for preparing the agenda and 
reporting the meeting. It is also in charge of correspondence 
and general matters.
(2) The Finance and Personnel Department:-
Is in charge of preparing the draft budget of the 
League and keeps the accounts of the League.
(3) Information Department
Is reponsible with providing information about the 
Arab homeland, Arab matters and the Arab League. The 
Department was particularly established to counteract
(.38) Abdul-Fatah Earned, The Arab League System, Egyptian 
Political Science Review, Special Issue on the 
Arab League, Cairo, March 1972, pp.114-117.
Zionist propaganda against the Arabs. The Information 
Department originally supervised the Arab League offices 
abroad. The latter are essentially concerned with 
receiving and supplying information activities.
(4) The Political Department :-
Is responsible for co-ordinating UN affairs, but the 
Department of social affairs is also competent to deal 
with the UN and its Specialised Agencies, such as the 
World Health Organisation and International Labour Organ­
isation .
C5) The Cultural Department
Is in charge of co-ordinating the League's relations 
with UNESCO and also suggesting programmes of cultural, 
co-operation between the Arab States, promoting Arab 
Culture, unifying educational systems in the Arab States 
and to combatting illiteracy.
(,6) The Palestinian Department;-
It was established by the Resolution No.469,
September 19 52, to handle all matters concerning Palestine 
and was placed under the supervision of one of the Assistant 
Secretary-Generals. This department assumed the responsibility 
for the education of the children of Arab refugees.
(,7) The Economic Department
Is responsible for the promotion of economic develop­
ment plans for the Arab League and its member States and 
to support the annual meeting of the Economic Council.
Within the Economic Department, the Petroleum Office, 
has been established since 1959 for organising the 
annual Arab Petroleum Conference. The Conference is 
attended by observers from the Non-Arab oil producing 
countries.
(39) Macdonald R.W. CpoCit* p.132.
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(,8) The Department of Communications;-
This Department primarily concerned with improving 
rail, road and air link between the Arab States. It is 
also responsible to supervise the programmes of the 
Arab Tele-communication Union and of the Arab Post 
Union, two have bureaux in Cairo.
(9) The Legal Department:-
Is concerned with studying in International Law 
in support of a proposal to establish an Arab Court 
of Arbitration.and in connection with problems involving 
International rights.
BUDGET AND FINANCIAL OOUTRIBUTION ; -
The annual fiscal budget of the Arab League is 
prepared by the Secretariat and contributions to. the 
Arab League expenses are made up by all member States. 
Each member State of the Arab League is obliged to pay 
a pro-rate share of the annual operating budget. The 
respective shares are determined by the League Council 
on the basis of national incomes and aie revised from 
time to time to take into account nev/ members admitted 
to the membership of the League.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:-
Article 12 of the Pact provides that the League 
Council shall appoint the Secretary-General by a vote 
of a two-third majority of the member States.
(.40) Alghnami Talat Muhammed, OpoCit. pp.59-69. 
(,4l) Macdonald R.W., Op. cit. pp .139-145*
The Pact failed to specify the duties and function 
of the League Secretary-General, but restricted itself 
to naming the first Secretary-General and to vest in 
him the authority to prepare the draft of the annual 
budget and to transmit invitations for the convocation 
of the League Council. According to Article 12 the 
Secretary-General holds the rank of Ambassador, thus 
confirming that he is not only the Chief administrative 
of the Arab League but also its principal representative 
at International Conferences and Organisations.
According to an Annex to the Pact the first appoint­
ment was for a period of two years, but the Council later 
established the term of office as five years, subject to 
renewal. The Administrative Regulation of the Secretariat 
provides for unspecified number of Assistant Secretaries 
General, nominated by the members States, appointed 
by the Secretary-General and approved by the League Council 
in accordance with Article 12 of the Pact. They work 
directly under the Secretary-General and exercise 
supervisory control over one or more departments of the 
Secretariat. They hold the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.
The office of the Secretary-General also includes 
four supervisors experts in the field of cultural, 
economic, public health and social affairs. The Pact 
of the Arab League only refers to administrative and 
budgetary functions of the Secretary-General. Therefore 
an analysis of the post of Secretary-General has to be 
approached from its role under the specific provision 
and thereafter from a review of its actual function.
(a) The role of the Secretary-General under Specific 
Provisions;-
The Principal power conferred upon the Secretary- 
General in accordance with Article 20 of the League 
Council's Internal Regulations is to draw the attention
"J5-
of the League Council to any question which might 
jeopardize the relations between member States or 
between member States and a third State. These powers 
were however involved in the Algerian-Morocco conflict 
of 1963, when the Secretary-General mediated on his 
personal initiative and on that occasion received the 
Council's acquiescence for his action. A further 
function is to make investigation and inquiries upon 
his own initiative. In due course he is obliged to 
inform the League Council about any matters which are 
entrusted to him.
In addition, the Secretary-General is authorised 
to attend the meeting of the League Council and to 
submit oral reports or statements on any question or 
situation under discussion by the League Council. 
Moreover, a practice has developed whereby the Secretary- 
General or his representative shall participate in the 
drafting of the Council's resolutions proposals or 
recommendations which later are to be submitted to the 
parties. In accordance with the provisions of the 
Council's Internal Regulations, which provide that the 
Secretary-General shall implement the Council's re­
solutions in the name of the Arab League. The council 
has relied on the Secretary-General to implement 
measures adopted in connection with particular dispute.
In fact that could be Émduced from the participation 
of the Secretary-General in various League Committees 
entrusted with conciliatory and fact-finding roles.
It was applied for instance in the Yemen=situation 
of 1948 and 1962, the Lebanese situation of 19 58 and 
Moroccan Algerian dispute of 1961. In the Syrian 
Egyptian dispute of 1961 in connection with the Union 
of 1958 of United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General 
was specifically entrusted by the Council to use his good
office with the two governments with a view to bring 
about a settlement of all outstanding affairs between 
the concerned States.
In the Kuwait-Iraq dispute of 1961, the council 
entrusted the Secretary-General with the power to take 
the necessary measures for the implementation of the 
Council’s resolutions which dealt with the situation.
In relation to disputes involving member States 
and third States the Secretary-General has frequently 
been entrusted with specific functions by the Council. 
For instance the Secretary-General was to act as a 
spokesman for the League policies at the General 
Assembly of the UN and on the Mixed Armistice 
C o m m i s s i o n s . T h e  role of the Secretary has developed 
along with the expansion of the scope and the activities 
of the Arab League. The functions of the Secretary- 
General tend to fall into two broad categories as 
Internal and External functions.
(b) Internal Function;-
The Secretary-General as the Principal Executive 
Officer of the Arab League is assigned tasks by the 
decisions and resolutions of the League Council. These 
decisions may include specific instructions to prepare 
studies on a technical subject which shall later be 
considered by the Council meeting.
The Council may authorize the Secretary-General 
to carry out negotiations within a specific form of 
reference laid down by the Council. The Secretary- 
General is usually charged with implementing broad 
programmes under the general supervision of the League
(42) Hassouna H., Op.cito pp.21028.
Council. The Secretary-General is also responsible to 
determine the attitude of member governments towards 
certain future actions that shall be carried out by the 
council of the League.
In 1947, for instance the Secretary-General was 
requested to determine the attitude of member States 
towards the proposed referendum in Libya to be super­
vised by the Arab League and to propose other steps that 
would ensure the independence of Libya.
The Secretary-General has played an important part 
in mediation either between disputing member States or 
between member States and an outside power. The Pact 
of the League initially envisaged the peaceful settle­
ment of any kind of dispute and conciliation.
Article 5 of the League Pact provides■expressly to 
exempt from the League Council jurisdiction of all 
disputes involving a member State's independence, 
sovereignty or territorial integrity.. The Secretary- 
General has frequently mediated in disputes between 
member States. In 19 58 the Secretary-General attempted 
to mediate a dispute between the Sudanese and Egyptians 
brought about by alleged Egyptian aggression against 
Sudan.
In the Yemen situation the Secretary-General found 
himself involved in the mediation between the United 
Arab Republic (Egypt) on one hand and Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia on the other hand.
(b) External Functions:-
In his external capacity the Secretary-General is 
considered the spokesman for the organisation, its 
principal diplomatic representative and its official 
observer at the UN.
In 1946 the British Foreign Office adopted a 
policy of dealing directly with the Arab League's 
Secretary-General in matters of general concern to the 
Arab World, and information copies of diplomatic 
correspondence with individual member States of the 
Arab League, v/ere also to be sent to the Secretary- 
General. The United States normally communicates with 
the Secretary-General through its Ambassador in Cairo.
The Secretary-General has frequently attended 
International Conferences as the official diplomatic 
representative of the Arab League with the rank of 
Ambassador. He always represents the Arab League in 
Rome at the Vatican Ceremonies for the installation 
of any new Pope. He also attends as an observer at the 
UN General Assembly sessions and has been officially 
concerned with formalizing relations between the Arab 
League and the UN• "The capacity for diplomatic 
negotiations developed by the Secretary-General is 
perhaps less appreciated in the United States than in 
other countries particularly in European and Asian 
countries where the Secretary-General is given official 
recognition as the spokesman and official representative 
of the Arab regional activity.
(43) Macdonald R.W. Op*cit. pp.146-165.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The most significant feature in the establishment 
of the Arab League was its commitment to economic develop­
ment, which has always been given a high priority in the 
Arab League plans, despite political obstacles. The Arab 
League Pact stipulates close collaboration of member 
States in economic, commercial and financial affairs, 
including a common fiscal policy in trade, agriculture, 
industry and in other economic spheres. This is also 
stipulated by the common Defence Treaty as a means of 
promoting Arab economic unity by organising Arab economic 
activities, facilitating the exchange of local products, 
exploiting their natural resources and concluding agree­
ments to attain these ends.
Some important steps toward the achievement of these 
ends have been made, starting with the conclusion of the 
convention facilitating trade exchange and the regulation 
of transit, trade between States of the Arab League, and 
the conclusion of the convention for the settlement of 
payments of current transactions and movement of capital 
between States of the Arab League. This convention 
provides for exemption from customs duties of all raw 
material produced in the region and a reduction of 
customs duties for most industrial products.
However, these two conventions maintain broad escape 
clauses which enable those States unv/illing or unable to 
implement the provisions to maintain a common front with 
the rest.
Despite the limitations contained in the Trade and 
Payments conventions, they helped to stimulate the 
expansion of trade within the Arab World.
(1) Sami-Abdul Hamid M. Op.cit. pp.383-385*
(2) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit. pp.197-202.
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A supplementary agreement on Inter-Arab trade was 
discussed in Winter 1959-60 as a result of the damage 
caused to the Lebanese economy by regional political 
tension after the crisis of 1958. An agreement concluded 
in December 1958 between the United Arab Republic (Syria 
and Egypt), Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia provides for 
transit rights for motor trucks owned by the citizens of the 
signatory powers, free from damaging customs procedures 
on transit fees. The signatories agreed to set up a 
supervisory commission consisting of member States. They 
also agreed that they would be bound by the agreement after 
it had been ratified by three contracting states and 
reported to the Arab League Council.
The idea of joint Arab development programmes was 
put forward at the meeting of Ministers of Finance and 
Economy of the Arab League States in May 1953. This 
proposal was submitted to the League Secretariat for 
further study and consideration. The League in conjunction 
with the World Bank studied this proposal closely. A 
draft project was presented to the first meeting of the 
League Economic Council in December 1956, the final 
decision by the Council, however, was reached in June 
1957.
The agreement provided for the establishment of the 
Arab Development Bank, affiliated to the Arab League.
This institution combines the functions of the World 
Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the 
International Development Association within the Arab 
World (all these agencies are affiliated to the U.N.)..
The Capital of the Bank initially mooted at 20 tiilliom 
Egyptian pounds and subsequently, raised to 25 million 
pounds as a result of the Kuwait's adherence to the 
agreement, was divided into 2000 shares. Member States 
of the Arab League may join the Bank by subscribing to 
share value proportionate to their percentage contribution
(3) A1 Ghanami M.T. Op.cit. pp.205-214.
to the League' e annual "budget* The Arab Development 
Bank seems /to play an important role in economic, 
financial and industrial developments within the Arab 
World, but it cannot be expected to solve the basic 
problems of the area. According to the Bank's Charter 
it is to support productive projects undertaken by the 
contracting governments as well as organisations and 
individuals of such countries*^^^
The Arab League project for joint Arab commercial 
ventures provided for transportation enterprises, 
including the establishment of an Arab Tanker Company, 
an Arab Pipeline Company, an Arab Shipping Company and an 
Arab Airline. Each Company is intended to be a joint 
stock corporation owned jointly by the Arab League 
governments. The Arab Potash Company is a joint enter­
prise of the government of Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon and the United Arab Republic with the participation 
of privately owned Arab banks established in 1956.^^^
The planning for future Arab integration was started 
with the conclusion of the 1950 Arab Collective Security 
Pact, for the purposes of bringing about security and 
prosperity in the Arab World. The Pact provides for the 
establishment of the Economic Council entrusted with 
the functions of promoting the exploitation of natural, 
agricultural, industrial and other resources of all 
contracting States in favour of Inter-Arab economic 
development. The Economic Council consists of the Ministers 
of Economy of the contracting States or their representatives.
The Economic Council is connected with security 
matters, which led to the limitations of its membership 
to those States which were signatories of the 19 50 Arab 
Collective Security Pact. Moreover the Council has occupied 
itself with political matters such as economic sanctions
(4) Macdonald R.W. Opocit. pp.202-209.
(5) A1 Ghanami M.T. the UN and the Specialised Agencies 
Volume 2 Atlas Press, Cairo 1971 (Arabic Text) p.1060.
against Prance as a result of its activities in Algeria- 
Although it failed to convene until December 1953 and 
was paralized during 1955-58 by inter-Arab political 
relations caused by Iraq/s adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact
The federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce,
Industry and Agriculture is an important autonomous 
agency in the field of regional economic activities. It 
is supervised by the Economic committee which has always 
acted as an organ that initiates■proposals before they 
are submitted to the Arab League. After 19 57 the agency 
demanded the expansion of the membership of the Economic 
Council to include all member States of the Arab League, 
as a reformative movement toward Arab regional integration.
At a meeting in January 19 58 of the Committee, the 
latter requested the League Secretariat-General to find 
a legal formula through which non-member States could 
become full members of the Economic Council. In March 
1959 the Committee decided that the Economic Council would 
be made separated from the 1950 Arab Collective Security 
Pact and constituted as a semi-autonomous organ consisting
of representatives of all member States of the Arab
( 7)
League. As a result of that^ two Arab States joined 
the Council.(
On June 6th, 1962 at the eighth session of the Economic 
Council, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Syria and Egypt signed 
an agreement providing for the establishment of a Council 
for Arab Economic Union. The agreement provides for 
freedom of travel and transfer of capital, exchange of 
goods^ residence, work and economic activities, transit, 
the use of harbour's and airports, right of ownership and 
inheritance.
C.6) Lenczowski G. pp.cit. p.645.
(7) Morocco and Libya.
(8) Al-Ghanami M.T. pp.1059-1061.
Article 2 of the agreement provides for the creation 
of a single Arab Customs area under one administration.
Legislation pertaining to tariffs and customs is to be
unified as are all legislation and regulations relating
to import and export procedures. Transport and transit
laws are to be reviewed and unified, unified policies
relating to agriculture, industry, real estate and monetary
activities are envisaged and provision is made for the
co-ordination of labour laws and legislation relating to
social security.
The Council consists of one full-time representative
from each of the member States. According to the agreement
the Council would have its headquarters in Cairo, but can
meet in any Arab city. It has its own budget subscribed
for by member States and operates as an independent organ.
The Presidency is to be held by each member in rotation
for a one-year period and décidions require a two-thirds
majority. In addition to special economic and administrative
committees, the Council set up a technical advisory office
( q ^
and a statistical section.^ '
The agreement was ratified by the required three 
signatories by the end of January 1964 and took effect 
after that. Other Arab States are eligible to join the 
Council, their adherence becomes effective one month 
after their signature of the agreement.
The first meeting of the Council of Arab Eaonomic 
Union convened at Arab League Headquarters in Cairo 
in June 1964 to put itself in operation. Luring that 
Session five Arab States joined the Council.
The Council also set up three permanent committees, 
and approved a budget of about ^215,000 for the first 
year contributed to proportionately, according to member’s 
shares in the League budget. They agreed to hold regular 
meetings every three months. The Presidency of the Council
(9) Al-Ghanami M.T- Op.cit. pp .1055-1058.
(10) Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Arab Republic 
of Yemen.
for the first year went to Jordan*
Some important achievements attained under the 
supervision of the Council of Arab Economic Union, 
are the following:-
In the field of trade, the Arab Oonmion Market 
programme proceeds as planned. According to reported 
schedules all agricultural products, mineral and animal 
resources are free from customs and administrative 
shackles and so are 80$S of manufactures. The remaining 
20^ became effectively duty free on January 1st 1971.
Thus the Council has achieved a free trade zone for 
its member States. The Council also approved the 
principle of quantitative preference in Trade between 
member States. Statistics indicated that the general 
volume of trade between member States increases re­
markably year after year. Technical Committees dealing 
with the study of tariffs are now at work to create 
unified customs tariffs. As regards the co-ordination 
of monetary policy the Council has approved a project 
for an Arab Union for multilateral payments and shorter 
term banking loan.
In the field of investment the Council approved 
some important principles that are to govern the 
transfer of capital between member States,
In the field of economic development the Council 
gave preference to the main industries such as sugar, 
paper and medical drugs etc. and also to communications 
in general.(^^)
In the international field, the Council decided to 
co-operate in trade and economic relations with other 
blocs such as the EEC, the COLIECON e’oc. Some international
(11) Cyclostyled Pamphlet, Issued by the Directorate of 
Information of the Arab League, The League of 
Arab States, objectives and Implementation 
(Arabic Text) pp.33-35*
organisations such as the International Conference, 
the GATT, the Industrial Development Organisation and
( 12)the DAG, have given a special welcome.- ^
It is now clear that the Arab Economic Union is 
ône of the most important organs of the Arab League.
It would appear that an integrated organisation 
similar to the EEC would obviate the need for the 
existence of the manifold separate development projects 
and give endeavours uniformity and added purpose. Some 
sort of Arab Common Market could play a role similar 
to that of the European Common Market. Such an agency 
could well devote considerable attention to the 
improvement of methods of technical agricultural, 
economic and financial development. The Council introduced 
a plan for an Arab Common Market, the plan apparently 
called for a ten-year transitional period, though it 
would appear that a ten-year period.is a short time.. 
Opposition to the Arab Common Market project is related 
to political interest. Despite the urgency of certain 
economic projects, decisions will continue to be made 
on political g r o u n d s A n o t h e r  difficulty encountered 
by the unifying endeavours of the Arab League is found 
in the variegated ideological and socio-economic 
commitments of the different member states, ranging 
from left-wing socialism to laissez-faire capitalism, 
with traditionalist trends successfully holding their 
ov/n.
In the Arab socialist countries about half of the 
national product is under direct control of the 
government. The ownership of all large enterprise is 
in the hands of the government. Private ownership and
C12) Abdul-Monem A1-Banna, the Arab Economic Unity,
Egyptian Political Science Review, Special Issue 
on the Arab League, Cairo, March 1972. pp,49-54.
(13) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit. ppol92-220o
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enterprises are allowed mainly in agriculture, light 
industry, retail trade, housing and routine services*
Yet even there sectors are not totally free from 
government regulations.
The Arab Capitalist countries maintain a policy 
of business freedom, low taxes, low tariffs, low 
national debu, relatively stable prices, stable currency 
and minimum restrictions on the inflow capital and 
the movement of emigrants and immigrants. As regards 
political stability, the Arab countries records 
shows that internal social harmony and inter-regional 
peace have been disrupted in most countries of the 
region to different degrees as a result of the Arab 
States, failure To substantiate either the so-called 
socialism on the superiority of the free market.
(14) Jalangir Amuzegan, the Ideology and Economic 
Growth in the Middle East, the Middle East 
Journal Volume 28, 1974, pp.1-9#
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION;-
At the League Conference in Alexandria, the 
Preparatory Committee set up a sub-committee to deal 
with cultural affairs with the object of drafting 
cultural treaties and agreements to lay dov/n the 
foundation of Arab cultural integration.
Article 2 of the Pact of the Arab League postulated 
that one of the major purposes of creation of the 
Arab League is to root the foundation of social and 
cultural integration between the Arab States.
Cultural- and social projects undertaken by the Arab 
League have been considerable and ambitious. Conferences 
have been held under the Arab League auspices to discuss 
such matters as archaeology, cultural and social relations, 
educational unification and the progressive unification 
of Arab legal codes.
The sub-committee commenced its activities in June 
1945* The first result of its activities, the production 
of a draft treaty was submitted to the League Council 
at its first session. The treaty was approved by the 
League Council on November 11th 1945* Thus being the 
first treaty between the Arab States to be approved 
by zt.dS)
The activities of the Arab League in the social 
and cultural fields are guided by the Arab League 
treaty of November 1945* National organisations have 
also been established in member States for the purpose 
of promoting and developing cultural integration 
between Arab States.
The League functions in the cultural field comprises 
of the improvement of educational facilities exchanges 
of teachers and students, the promotion of youth
(15) Seabury Paul, the League of Arab States, Debacle
of a Regional Arrangement, International Organisation 
Volume No.19, p.639. 1949.
'activities and sports, the preservation of the Arab
social and cultural heritage, the encouragement of
translations of great works of literature, science and
the arts, the establishment of libraries and museums
and the development of professional associations. In
the social field the function of the Arab League
involves the study of current social problems,
seminars for the training of sociologists and social
workers and work in allied fields of labour, medicine,
public health and criminology
The operational technique has been used by the
Arab League in carrying out its cultural and social
functions involves the convocation of ad hoc conferences
of professional men followed by the creation of a
continuing programmes of activities. In the meantime,
the staff members of the League Secretariat and the
technical committees perform the preliminary staff
work, support the conferences and publish the usual
reports and proceedings.
for the most part, the League has sponsored such
conferences as for instances six Arab cultural conferences,
(17)four archaeological c o n f e r e n c e s ' Several Arab 
Writers Conferences, four Conferences for Arab teachers, 
a Linguistic conference, dealing with the adjustment 
of Arabic to contemporary developments and several 
conferences for Arab journalists. In the social fields 
the League has sponsored at least six Arab social Affair 
Conferences, a number of Medical and Dental Conferences, 
Social Arab Lawyers Conferences were sponsored by the 
Legal Committee of the League Council and the Legal 
Department of the League Secretariat
(.16) Cyclostyled Pamphlet. Opocit. pp.35-38*
(.17) In 1947, 1957, 1959 and 1963.
(l8) Al-Ghanami M.T. Op.cit. pp.199-204.
The reports and proceedings of the said Conferences 
were always published by the League Secretariat. The 
operational technique of such conferences has always 
led to the establishment of autonomous professional 
societies with regional scope, such as the federation 
of Arab Lawyers, the Arab Journalists’ Union, the 
federation of Arab Physicians and the Arab Teachers’ 
federations.
The Arab League always collaborates with the UN 
and its Specialised Agencies such as the UNESCO, the 
fAO, the WHO and ILO, in both the cultural and social 
fields. The Arab League’s representatives and Arab 
experts have attended a variety of conferences sponsored 
by the UN and its Specialised Agencies.
Most of these conferences have been held outside the 
Arab World, for example, in 1950 the UN sponsored a 
conference for the Arab World on social welfare was held 
in Denmark. So far a number of conferences on social 
welfare have been held in various Arab countries sponsored 
by the UN at the request of the Arab League. The Arab 
League provided the technical and administrative back-up, 
the League's Social Affairs Department assumed the burden 
of administering and organising the conferences with the 
assistance of the Arab host government. The UN.’s experts 
and the interested Specialised Agencies involved in such 
matters attended with the rank of observers.
In 1953 the UN, with the collaboration of the Arab 
League, organised a conference on social defence dealing 
with crime, prison organisations etc. and in 1959 
a conference concerned with co-operatives in the Middle 
East sponsored jointoy by the ILO, the PAD and the 
Arab League.
A conference on the development of societies in 
the Arab countries held in Cairo in November 1963 was
attended by representatives from Arab States including 
observers from PAO, WHO, ILO and UNICEF. The joint 
Arab League-UNESCO conference on University education 
in the Arab countries took place in Beirut in September 
1963 and dealt with a proposal to create a Federation 
of Arab Universities
The Arab League has been devoted on a large scale 
to the development of social and cultural activities*
It established Arab Olympics and organised Pan-Arab 
Games in a four-year cycle, an annual training programme 
for athletic trainers and coaches and Arab Boy Scout 
Jamborees every two years.
Thé Arab League has always endeavoured to encourage, 
professional writing in social and cultural activities. 
In that connection prizes have been offered for the 
production of valuable Arabic works in the social and 
cultural fields. For the most part the publication of 
significant works have been subsidized by the Arab 
League *
There are a number of operating agencies under 
the supervision of the League Secretariat, designated 
to implement programmes that have been adopted and to 
provide continuing services in the respective fields.
In the meantime a number of the Arab Specialised 
Agencies are directly affiliated with and under the 
supervision of the League Secretariat such as the 
Arab Narcotics Bureau, the Arab Manuscript Institute, 
the Cultural Museum, a number of social service centres, 
a co-operative Training Centre, an Institute of 
Advanced Arab Civilization Studies and several Residence 
Halls for Arab students in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,
Yemen, Jordan and Syria*^
(19) Al-Ghanami M.T. Op.cit. pp.1050-1055.
(20) Sami Abdul Hamid M. Op.cit. p.387*
The tenth Arab League Medical Conference which 
took place in Baghdad in March 1962, it was also 
the first Congress of the Federation of Arab Physicians. 
The Conference set up technical committees to study the 
problem of unifying Arabic Medical terminology. More­
over the Conference decided in principle to establish 
an Arab Health Organisation. Such an organisation 
could absorb some activities of the Arab Dental Federation, 
the Arab Veterinary Federation and the Arab Pharmaceutical 
Federation and to take over such functions from the Arab 
League Secretariat.
The International Confederation of Arab Trade Union
(ICATU) is closely associated with the Arab League
Secretariat, although it was not established as a direct
result of the Arab League activities. ICATU was founded
at a 1956 Arab Labour Congress in Damascus, and obtained
recognition of the ILO as a regional Labour Organisation.
By 1964 Labour Union in a number of Arab States associated
with the ICATU. The latter is primarily concerned to
f 21 )organise workers in the Arab W o r l d *
The Arab Ministers of Education held their second 
Conference in Baghdad in February 1964, which focused 
on revising the cultural treaty of November 1945 and to 
discuss cultural conditions in the Arab countries in 
order to lay the foundations for the Arab Cultural 
integration. The culmination of that Conference was 
the production of the,Arab Cultural Integrity Charter 
and the Statute of the Arab Organisation for Education, 
Culture and Science. The Charter and Statute were signed 
by the Arab Ministers, ratified by some Arab States and 
approved by the League Council. Article 31 of the Arab
(21) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit. pp.172-183*
Cultural Integrity Charter provides that the Charter
he put into effect one month after the documents of
ratification have been deposited with the Secretariat
General of the Arab League.
Article 14 of the Statute of the Arab Organisation
for Education, Culture and Science provides that the
Statute be ratified together with the ratification of
the Charter and become effective one month after three
member States have deposited the instrumental documents
of the ratification of both the Charter and Statute.
Article 3 of the Charter stipulated the development
of the cultural machinery of the Arab League, namely the
integration of cultural ‘development, the Arab Manuscripts
Institute, the Higher Institute for Arab Studies, into
one organisation under the supervision of the Arab
League, to be called the Arab Organisation for Education,
Culture and Science. Its objects are to organise the
common efforts made by member States to achieve the
aims of the Charter.
Article 1. of this organisation stipulated that the
aims in its statute are to foster the intellectual
integrity of the Arab countries through education,
( 22)culture and science.' ^
The long and the short, of it is however, that no 
enforcement authority upon member States in the functional 
field, of the implementation of such regional programmes, 
but in due coui'se, the Departmental staffs in the League 
Secretariat can maintain contact with the appropriate 
officials of member governments and remind them to 
submit reports for the progress of implementing the 
maid programmes.
(22) El-Assad Nasseï^ed-Din, the Arab Cultural Integrity. 
Egyptian Political Science Review, Special Issue 
on the Arao League, Cairo, March 1973* pp.67-74.
It would appear that most of the League's social 
and cultural activities have either been abandoned or 
pigeonholed due to the rivalry and the conflicting 
ambitions of its member States. The League has become 
the scapegoat for the existing differences among Arab 
countries.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTEGRATION;-
The Cultural Treaty of November 1945 provides for 
co-operation,between the Arab Scientists, promotion of 
Scientific Conferences, the development of research 
laboratories and institutes and the publication of 
scientific papers and studies. The Cultural Department 
of the Arab League Secretariat and, since April 1969, 
the section of Science and Technology, has been in 
charge of implementing these provisions.^
It v/ould appear that the approach of the Arab League 
in Science and Technology is concerned to exploit the 
scientific advances and technological know-how of the 
West for the purposes of military and economic advantages 
but at the same time to preserve the best features of 
the prevailing regional culture and civilization.
In principle a considerable increase in scientific 
activities have occurred in a number of Arab States.
This is to be added to the credit-side of the Arab 
League. The latter has undoubtedly played a major role 
in stimulating scientific and technological development 
in the Arab World, but this credit must be shared with 
the interested Specialised Agencies of the UN.
The operational techniques used by the League 
Secretariat in order to carry out its scientific and 
technical functions consist in the convocation of
(,23) El-Assad Nasser-ed-Din . Op.cit. pp.69-71.
conferences on Science and Technology. Several Arab 
Conferences on science had been held since the end of 
1964 along with Nine Arab Engineering Conferences.
The resolutions of such Conferences are always submitted 
to the League Council for approval and because of that 
connection they have a quasi-official status.
In 19 53 the first Scientific Conference was held 
in Alexandria and adopted a draft proposal for the 
establishment of a Permanent Arab Scientific Federation.- 
The proposal was approved by the League Council in 
January 1954* In the meantime, the Culrural Department 
of the League Secretariat set up a preparatory committee 
of professors of science in Cairo for the purpose of 
drawing up a constitution for the Permanent Arab Scientific 
Federation. A draft constitution was subsequently submitted 
to the Cultural Department, the latter approved of the 
said constitution and worthwhile members for the Federation 
were selected at a general meeting of the preparatory 
Committee held in Lebanon in September 19 54.^^^^
The Arab Scientific Federation was finally established 
as an independent Organisation although co-operation and 
co-ordination with the Arab League is constant. The 
constitution of the Federation provides for principal 
Headquarters in Cairo and affiliated national sections 
in each Arab country. The functions of the Federation 
are to arrange for periodic Scientific Conferences as 
well as to conduct relations with foreign Scientific 
Institutes and with the interested Specialised Agencies, 
of the UN in such fields for exchange of reports, 
researches and scholars to publish a scientific review, 
including information of foreign scientific activities, 
to provide financial assistance to scholars for 
researches and publications and to encourage co-operation
(24) Abul-Futuh Hamed Auda. Op.cit. pp.142-143*
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between Scientific Institutes in the Arab countries.
In 1959 the Arab Engineering Conference took place 
in Cairo, it was attended by 1500 participants from all 
over the Arab countries. The reports and proceedings 
of the Conference were published in both Arabic and 
English by the League Secretariat and were given wide 
publications..
Subsequently, a Conference took place in Baghdad in 
December 1964. The Conference discussed engineering 
technical education, the exploitation of mineral re­
sources, and the engineer’s role in agricultural 
planning and land reclamation in the Arab countries
The Arab League always collaborates with the XM 
and the interested Specialised Agencies such as the 
UNESCO, the Science co-operation office, and the IAEA 
regional isotope training centre (both in Cairo) in 
regional scientific programmes.
The Arab Tele-Communications Union and the Arab 
Postal Union maintain permanent bureaux in Cairo, 
affiliated to the League Secretariat. Both were created 
by International Treaties and are linked with the Arab 
League by formal conventions. The function of these 
organisations are to provide technical information 
and consulting services to the Arab States, to exchange 
technicians and to unify operating programmes between 
the Arab States. The bureaux are operating under the 
Supervision of their own Congresses. In this connection 
they are the Secretariat of the Congresses. The operating 
budget of these unions are approved by the Congresses 
and the contribution to the expenses of these organisations 
are directly provided by the member States. The Congresses 
&s the Supreme organs elect the Directors of the bureaux.
(,25) Aldul-Eutuh Hamed Auda. Op.cit. pp .139-141 *
The Arab Telecomiïïimication Union in conjunction with, 
the ITU have designed a number of telecomuni cation 
programmes of international micro-wave radio circuit, 
between various Arab Centres with links to Europe#
The Arab .Postal Union maintains a membership of the 
UPU in accordance with Article 8 of the Universal Postal 
Convention which regulates the relationship between the 
UPU and other regional Postal Unions#
The APU established the Institute for Advanced 
Postal Training in Khartoum in 19.58, operating under 
the supervision of the bureau of the Union* The bureau . 
is regularly publishing a newsletter, a technical reviev/ 
and a directory of post offices in the Arab countries#
The Arab League’s Communications Committee approved 
in 1955 the project of a Pan-Arab Transportation Network 
which included rail, highv/ay, air and marine routes.
The Council of Heads of Arab States in its second 
session in Alexandria in September 1964, established 
the Common Arab Scientific Council for utilising atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes within the scope of the 
Arab League. The Common Arab Scientific Council produced 
a draft agreem.ent for the Arab co-operation in utilizing 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes v/hich was subsequently 
approved by the Coun.cil of Arab League in March 1965.
The functions of the Council ar’e to develop energy, 
to follow up the progress in science and technology 
in the world, to co-ordinate the requirements of unific­
ation of the Arab States policies in science and 
technology, to maintain: relations with the UN Consultative 
Committee in science and technology, International 
Scientific and Technological Conferences, the Regional 
Middle East Centre and also with the Industrial Develop­
ment Centre. The Council is also responsible for
(v26) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit. pp. 183-189 •
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implementing the plan for the establishment of the
Supreme Council for science in the Arab countries
comprising, of a scientific and technological centre,
documentation, information, industrial patent,
(27)translation and publishing section*^ ‘
In 1970 the Administrative Committee of the Common 
Arab Scientific Council decided, with conjunction of the 
Industrial Development Centre to establish an Arab 
firm for the manufacture and maintenance of laboratory 
instrument appliances and educational aids to be 
provided to the Arab^countries•
The Council has also collaborated with the Middle 
East Centre to carry out laboratory studies on how to 
produce cotton seeds, free from poisonous material, 
to be used as food in the Arab countries.
In Aphil 1969 the Secretary-General of the Arab 
League set up a department for Science and Technology 
within the League Secretariat-General.
In August 1969 a Scientific and Technological 
Conference took place in Cairo sponsored by the Arab 
League, to study water wealth and oceanography in the 
Arab countries and to co-ordinate the Arab effort in 
these matters.
Subsequently another Conference was held in 
November 1969 (in the same place) to study hydraulics, 
water sources, the best way of exploiting them, method, 
to control water resources and to encoi.nage studies in 
these fields.
(27) Abul-Futuh Hamed Auda. Op.cit, pp «>.133-135.
(28) Yehia Abu-Baker, the Mission of Information in 
Common Arab Action, Egyptian Polirical Science 
Review, Special Issue on the Arab League,
Cairo - March 1972, pp.107-109»
In November 1969 the sixbh Arab Sceintific Conference 
took place in Damascus, v/hich discussed a plan for promoting 
the development in science and technology and the co­
operation and co-ordination in these fields in the Arab 
countries.
The increase of technical and scientific programmes 
have led to the establishment of autonomous specialised 
Agencies of the Arab League.
In conclusion it has to be mentioned that the 
effectiveness of the efforts of the Arab League in the 
technical and scientific fields has been greatly under­
mined by regional rivalries. On the other hand the 
establishment of a technical assistance bureau of the 
Arab League might both overcome rivalries and succeed to 
co-ordinate inter-Arab endeavours without insisting on a 
formal uniformity of action. Despite the conflict between 
the national policies of member States and regional 
integration considerable progress has been made in the 
scientific, technical, economic, cultural and social 
field, by the Arab League but not everything proposed 
by the League has been accomplished*
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT : -
International peace and security is the responsibility 
of the World Community, which shall be maintained through 
the authority of the World organisation in conjunction 
with regional organisations. The UN Charter, in this 
connection follows the pattern of placing regional 
organisations under the supervision of the Security 
Council in carrying out their responsibility regarding 
regional security. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter deals 
with regional organisation as agencies for the maintenance 
of international peace and security in cases where the UN
C29) Al-Ghanami Ï.M. Op.cit. pp.211-214.
cannot carry out its international responsibility*
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that regional 
organisations must have some kind of effective means of 
sharing responsibility with the World organisation for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, 
appropriate for settling regional disputes before 
referring them to the UN, Security Council and acting 
as local agencies of the UN in effecting peaceful 
settlements of disputes, provided that such activities 
of those agencies/consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the UN•
In any case, regional agencies must have an adequate 
machinery for settling regional disputes, this is the 
qualification for a regional arrangement within the 
meaning of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
At the UN Conference on international organisation 
the US delegation put forward a proposed amendment to the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals so as to give regional organis­
ations the right of collective action to defend their 
respective countries within the framework of their 
jurisdiction which was fully supported by both the Arab 
and Latin American delegates. The result of the acceptance 
of the US amendment is that regional organisations such 
as the Arab League, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the organis­
ation of American States invoked Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, when they drafted their Security treaties*
These regional arrangements established in accordance with 
Article 51 as collective defence agencies were entrusted 
with primary responsibility for the purpose of taking 
counter measures against external aggression or the 
threat of aggression.
The Arab League is a regional organisation, not a 
collective self-defence arrangement. In this connection 
it is important to mention here that the Arab League, 
therefore, conformed with the provisions of Article 52
and not of Article 51 of the ULX Charter. In order to 
bring the Arab League under the provisions of Article 
51 of the UN Charter, the 1950 Arab Collective Security 
Pact was concluded as a collective self-defence arrange­
ment, entrusted with the purpose of counter measures 
directed against external aggression, and empowered 
to deal with internal disputes, and to bring about 
peaceful settlements
Article 53 of the UN Charter provides that the
ioKêh î-
Security Council shall, appropriate, utilise such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
actions under its authority. It is also mentioned
that "no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangement or by regional agencies without
the authorisation of the Security Council* From this,
it is clear that measures, that have been taken by
regional organisation shall be continued for an
indefinite period if the Security Council fails to
carry out its primary responsibility for the maintenance
( 31)of international peace and security.'^ '
This is the difference between regional organisations 
based on Article 51 and those based on Article 53 which 
requires a prior authorisation by the UN Security Council 
for the purpose of carrying out an effective action.
In fact, most of the World's regional arrangements are 
based on Article 51 to avoid such prior authorization
(.30) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit. pp.221-224.
(31) In this connection, it would appear that the Uniting 
for Peace Resolutions of June 25th and 27th, 19 50, 
of the UN General Assembly modified the autonomy and 
independence of regional arrangements based on 
Article 51.
In conformity with the 19 50 Resolution, the General 
Assembly may consider the matter immediately with a 
view to make appropriate recommendations to the 
member States for collective measures,including the 
use of armed force if the Security Council fails to 
discharge its primary responsibility in maintaining 
international peace and security because of lack 
of unanimity among its permanent members. This 
superseded the temporary powers of regional 
organisations to exercise their right of self-defence 
in case of the failure of the UN Security Council.
( 32)by the Security Council
In short, the Arab League is based on Article 52
as a regional organisation and on Article 51 as a collective
self-defence arrangement within the framework of the UN 
■for the settlement of regional disputes.
When the Arab League Pact was signed means were
provided for integrating the work of the League with the 
future World organisations. This is envisaged in Article 
3 of the Arab League Pact which provides that the League 
will collaborate with the international organisations 
which may be created in the future, to guarantee peace 
and security and organise economic and social relations
The 19 50 ARAB COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT;-
The Pact officially known as the Joint Defence and 
Economic Co-operation Treaty, was concluded in 19 50 
between the original seven members of the Arab League. 
Subsequently, it was adhered to by all member States of 
the Arab League* The 19 50 Arab Collective Security Pact 
was approved by the League Council on April 17, 1950, 
and became effective on August 23rd, 19 53 *
The 19 50 Arab Collective Security Pact maintained no 
provisions for an institutionalized security organisation. 
The discussion of San Francisco Conference in 194-5 had 
clearly indicated that a r^ional organization must 
provide an institutionalized mechanism for settling 
regional disputes in order to qualify as a regional
(32) Gerhard Bebr, Regional Organisations; - A UîT Problem 
American Jcui'nal of International Law, Volume 49,
19 55, Washington, pp.166-175#
(33) Khaddunri M. Op.cit* pp.773-775.
(34) Signed by Eg2,mt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen - on June 17th, 19 50, by Iraq on February 
2nd, 1951 and by Jordan on February 16th, 19 52.
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organisation under the UN Charter.
It is therefore significant that six months after 
the signature of the Arab League Collective Security 
Pact, the General Assembly of the UN invited the Arab 
League to attend meetings of the UN organs with the 
status of observer. The main aims of the Security Pact 
were defined as co-operation for the realization of 
mutual defence and the maintenance of regional security 
and peace, according to the principles of both the UN 
Charter and the Arab League Pact.
Article 4 of the Security Pact stated that the 
contracting States agreed to co-operate in consolidating 
and co-ordinating their armed forces and participate 
each, in accordance with its resources, and needs in 
the preparation of their individual and collective means 
of defence and the repulsion of armed aggression.
The new. Arab League organs established uhder the 
terms of the 1950 Pact were the Joint Defence Council, 
the Economic Council and a Permanent Military Commission
Article 6 of the Security Pact provides, that a 
Joint Defence Council, under the supervision of the Arab 
League Council, shall be formed, consisting of the 
foreign ministers and the defence ministers of the 
contracting parties or their representatives.
The task of the Council is the supervision and the 
implementation of the provision of the Pact, concluded 
by the contracting states. Article 5 of the Security 
Pact provides, that a Permanent Military Commission 
composed of representatives of the General Staffs of 
the armies of the contracting States shall be formed.
It is entrusted with the technical tasks of drawing 
up plans for collective defence and with the preparing 
of the means and methods of the implementations.
"A detailed definition of the functions of the Permanent
-DJ-
Military Commission v/as contained in a Military Annex 
which was declared to be an integral part of the Pact, 
Article 9, which was approved, signed and ratified at 
the same time as the Pact
Section 1 of the Military Annex provides that the 
Permanent Military Commission shall undertake the 
following;-
(a) In co-operation with the Joint Defence Council, 
to prepare plans to deal with all anticipated dangers 
or armed aggression that may he launched against one
or more of the contracting States or their armed forces, 
such plans to be based on the principles determined by 
the Joint Defence Council,
(b) to submit proposals for the organisation of the 
forces of the contracting States, stipulating the 
minimum force for each, in accordance with military 
exigencies and the potentialities of each State,
(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness 
of the forces of the contracting States in so far as their 
equipment, organisation and training are concerned, so 
that they may keep pace with modern military methods
and development and for the unification and co-ordination 
of all such forces.
(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural 
agricultural, industrial and other resources of all 
contracting States in support of the inter-Arab military 
effort and joint defense.
(e) to organise the exchange of training mission between 
the contracting States for the preparation of plans, 
participation in military exercises and manoeuvers and 
the study of their results, recommendations for the
(35) Sayegh Payez A. Arab Unity, Hope and Fulfillment, 
the Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1958. p.146.
improvement of methods to ensure close co-operation in 
the field; and for the general improvement of the forces 
of all the contracting States.
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and 
military potentialities of each of the contracting States 
and the part to he played by the forces of each in the 
joint military effort,
(g) to discuss'the facilities and various contributions 
which each of the contracting States, in conformity with 
the provisions of this Pact, might be asked to provide 
during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of each 
other contracting States as might be operating its 
territory.
A: collective Military Council composed of the Chiefs 
of Staff of the contracting States was subsequently 
established by a Supplementary Protocol to the Pact.
Section 5 of the Military Annex provides that in 
the event of v/ar a Joint Arab Commander-in-Chief shall 
be appointed. Although no Permanent Military Command was 
envisaged in the Pact, such Joint Command was established 
by the First Arab Summit Conference in 1964. The latter 
also agreed to the appointment of UAR (Egypt) General 
All Amer as Joint Arab Commander, the formation of a 
Permanent Joint Military Planning Staff at the Arab 
League Secretariat and plans for joint manoeuvers intended 
to - co-ordinate regional security requirements.
Section 4 of the Military Annex provides that the 
Commission shall establish its Headquarters in Cairo 
but it may hold meetings in any other place the Commission 
may specify. It is also mentioned that the Commission 
shall elect its Chairman for two years•
Article 6 of the Security Pact stipulates that 
decisions adopted by a two-thirds majority of the 
Council shall be binding upon all the contracting States.
Five years earlier the signatories had refused commit­
ment to decisions other than those adopted unanimously.^^^)
The Pact was concluded for an indefinite period, 
however, withdrawal from the Pact is envisaged in 
Article 12 of the Security Pact, which provides that 
after a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratific­
ation of this Pact, any one of the contracting States 
may withdraw from it, providing 12 months notice is 
previously given to the Secretary-General of the Arab 
League, and the latter shall inform the other contracting 
States of such notice. The Pact made no provision con­
cerning the accession of other Arab States.
The contracting States pledged themselves to 
refrain from the use of force in settling their disputes 
and to resort to peaceful means only. They also committed 
themselves*' hot to conclude agreements contrary to the 
provisions of the Pact in their mutual arrangements or 
with third powers.
The 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact was criticised 
for the provisions that excluded non-signatory members 
of the Arab League from the membership of Arab League 
organs established as a direct result of the 1950 Pact.
■ The role of the supplementary organs created by the 
1950 Pact had been limited, since none of the new members 
of the Arab League adhered to the Pact until 1961. 
Nevertheless non-adherents could attend meetings of 
these organs as observers, although they could not 
participate in the decision-making process.
The Pact was signed in June 19 50, but it was not 
implemented until the middle of 1953 when the Chiefs 
of Staff of the signatory Arab States met in Cairo to 
draw up the final plans.
(.36) Sayegh Fayes A. Op*cit. pp.144-149.
(37) Macdonald R.vY. Op.cit. pp.48-50*
Su’taseq.uen'tly the Permanent Military Commission met 
in October 1953 in Cairo. It is important to mention 
here that little came of that meeting except a recommend­
ation for unifying the efforts of the Arab States in 
'defence and the maintenance of peace and security*
At all events, Iraq adhered to the Baghdad Pact in 
1955 which caused grave discussions within the Arab 
League, to the extent that it led to the paralysis of 
the 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact.
There also seemed little likelihood that any Arab 
member State would ever permit the establishment and 
stationing of a permanent Joint Arab Command force of 
any importance on its territory.
The Collective Security Pact demonstratively failed 
in its objectives in November 1956 in the aftermath 
of the Anglo-Prench attacks on the Suez Canal Zone, 
and the Israeli in the Sinai • The signatories
of the Pact completely failed to carry out their 
obligations under Articles 2, 4 and also Section 5 of 
the Military Annex, because they did not take any 
active part, collectively to repel the external 
aggression against one of its contracting members 
Egypt,
The Arab Collective Security Pact revived after 
the first Arab Summit Conference in 1964, with a special 
reference to Isreal Plans to divert Jordan River waters 
to the parched Negev and alleged Israeli attempts to 
develop nuclear weapons.
One of the most significant events which helped 
to pave the way for the revival of the 19 50 Arab 
Collective Security Pact was Iraq’s withdrawal from the 
Baghdad Pact in 1959 after the military coup d’etat in 
1958* Moreover, the new approach was demonstrated by 
the determined stand and the successful mediation of
(38) Macdonald R.';V, Op*cit. pp.224-229.
the Arab League in the 1958 Lebanon, crisis-
The Military Chiefs of Staff of the signatory 
powers of the Collective Security Pact^^^^ and 
observers from Libya, Morocco and the Sudan held a 
meeting in Cairo in April 1961, to discuss joint Arab 
defence policies, which was followed by the June 1961 
Session of the Joint Defence Council- On June 13th, 1961
io
Morocco adhered to the Security Pact- The
ory,
--©=# the 19 50 Arab Collective Security Pact was invoked 
for the first time in its history in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
dispute, v/hich allowed the Arab League to intervene in 
this dispute- In the meantime, Kuwait adhered to the 
Security Pact- A formal agreement concluded between 
the Arab League and the government of Kuwait on 
August 12th, 1961 provided the legal and operational 
framework of the Joint Arab force-^^^) In this connection 
Kuwait requested the British Covernment to evacuate its 
troops in preparation for the entry of the proposed 
Arab force that v/as to carry out its task in conformity 
with the Security Pact. On the strength of the Kuwait's 
request the British troops began their withdrawal upon 
the arrival of the Arab forces-
(.39) Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAR (Egypt) 
and Yemen.
(40) Initially, Kuwait requested the British to implement 
their defence treaty of mutual co-operation and 
assistance. The British Government first went to 
the Security Council and requested a special 
meeting on behalf of the Kuwait's Government.
The meeting was held on July 2nd, 1961 but after 
several sessions the Security Council failed to 
adopt any decision as a result of the Soviet veto 
on July 7th, 1961, because Egypt and the Soviet 
Union attempted to force Great Britain to with­
draw its troops from the Kuwait territory.
The troops of Arab League "began to arrive in 
Kuv/ait on September 10th, 1961, the forces were drawn 
from the UAR (Egypt) Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia 
and the Sudan. The Arab force was placed under a 
Saudi Arabian Commander, and remained in Kuv/ait until 
February 1963.
The January 1964 Summit of the Head of Arab States, 
which took place in Cairo, approved the establishment 
of a Joint Arab Command under General Ali Amer.
The remaining non-adhering Arab States joined^
the Collective Security Pact during the Second Arab
Summit meeting held in Alexandria in September 1964*^^^^
Since 1962 the peace of the Arab World has been 
shattered by broad wrangling over the Yemen, involving 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAR (Egypt), the Arab 
Israeli conflict and the differences among the Arab 
States on strategic plans towards Israel. In addition 
disputes between Morocco and Mauritania on the one 
hand and Algeria on the other hand over the Western 
Sahara on what was called ^ Spanish Sahara, the Lebanese 
Civil v/ar and the border dispute between South and 
North Yemen, have further impeded closer co-operation 
among the Arab States *
SETTLEMENT OP DISPUTES
The Pact of the Arab League does not provide 
the establishment of an effective institutionalised 
mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The Pact prohibits the use of force for the settlement 
of disputes between member States of the Arab League, 
but dispute that involves the independence of a member
(41) Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Sudan.
(42) Macdonald R.W. Opocit. pp*234-239.
State, its sovereignty, or its territorial integrity, 
shall not he subject to the jurisdiction of the League 
Council•
Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League provides 
that the council shall mediate in all differences which 
threaten to lead to war between two member States or a 
member State a,nd a third State, with a view to bringing 
about their reconciliation*
In practice, disputes between member States have 
been handled by the traditional methods of arbitration, 
conciliation, mediation and good office, by the Secretary- 
General, one of the assistant Secretary-Generals or 
sometimes by an. ad hoc investigating commission established 
to undertake these tasks. These efforts however have not 
always been successful.
The Article further provides that decisions on 
arbitration, and mediation shall be taken by majority 
vote. In this connection the majority does not include 
the votes of the member States in dispute.
The 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact also failed 
to establish any institutionalised mechanism for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes between member States, 
although it re-affirmed' in Article 1 "the intention 
of contracting parties to settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means whether such disputes concern 
relations among themselves or with other sowers.
Cl) MELIATICN, CONCILIATION AND GOOD OPPICES;-
Article 5 of the Arab League Pact mentions the 
mediation of the League Council in disputes which threaten
(.43) Khadduri fl. Op.cit. p.770.
(44) Macdonald R.W. Op.cit* p*234o
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to lead to war 'between member States or a member State 
and a third State, with a view to bringing about re­
conciliation • The Council usually endeavours to eictend 
its peaceful intervention beyond the limits imposed by 
'this Article with a view to bringing about reconciliation. 
Por instance in the Egyptain-Syrian dispute of 1961, 
after the dissolution of the 1958 union between them, 
the League Council refrained from pronouncing upon the 
specific claims rendered by the disputing States, but 
attempted to conciliate them with a view to settling 
the dispute* In connection with the Lebanese allegation 
of indirect aggression by the UAR (Syria and Egypt) in 
1958, the Council followed a similar conciliatory 
approach, but the attempts of the Council proved un­
successful when the Lebanese government rejected such 
initiative and went to the UN. In the Kuwait-Iraq 
dispute of 1961, the Council rejected Iraq's territorial 
claim upon Kuwait and affirmed Kuwait's independence as 
a sovereign state and provided effective measures for 
the preservation of Kuwait's territorial integrity
The precedents set by these examples indicate that 
the Council's approach to the inter-Arab disputes always 
favours conciliation between member States rather than 
adjudication of their claims, for this purpose the 
League's fundamental policy is seeking to preserve 
solidarity and unity among its member States.
In the dispute between Morocco and Algeria in 1963, 
the attempts of the Council proved unsuccessful when 
the Moroccan government rejected the initiative of the 
League Council. On several occasions the Council 
established special subsidiary commission to undertake
C45) Refa-a Muharnmed Ali, the Arab League and Liberation 
Matters, the Egyptian Company for Pressing and 
Publication, Cairo, May 1971* (Arabic Text) no. 
231-266.
investigatory functions, but often entrusted these to 
the good offices of the Secretary General, for instance, 
in the border dispute of 1973 between North and South 
Yemen the Council established a conciliatory commission 
under the Chairmanship of an Assistant Secretary-General 
which v/as sent to investigate the dispute and to report 
to the League Council.
In disputes involving members and non-members, the 
Pact of the Arab League refers in Article 5 to the 
mediation of the Council in disputes which present a 
threat of v^ ar between a member State and a third State.
In all disputes of such nature, the League handled the 
situations by providing appropriate means for the peaceful 
settlement, for example the dispute of Syria and Lebanon 
with Prance, Tunisia-Prance dispute of 1961, and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
The nature of intervention of the League in these 
cases that of a regional system against an external 
threat, rather than a regional procedure for peaceful 
settlement of internal discutes
(2) ARBITRATION!-
Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League mentions 
the role of the League Council as an organ of arbitration 
subject to limitations of jurisdiction mentioned before 
(p.68 and 69)®
On the other hand, the parties to a dispute must . 
agree in advance to have .recourse to the League Council 
for arbitration, in such cases decisions of the Council 
will require an ordinary majority vote to be carried 
excluding the votes of the parties to that dispute.
(46) Hassouna H. Op.cit. pp.13-16.
f C .'
and these decisions will he binding on the parties 
to the dispute.
The provision, making arbitration conditional on 
advance agreement of the member States in dispute to 
•submit it to the League Council for arbitration, 
arises out of the fact that most inter-member disputes 
were and are of a mixed character and thus involve 
questions of sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
integrity, which could, therefore, exclude the dispute., 
a priori, from the jurisdiction of the League Council.
The League Council is competent to deal with legal 
issues as long as they fall within its broad competence 
under the Pact. For instance in the Jordan Case of 1950 
when the latter incorporated the West Bank into the 
Kingdom of Jordan in trust for the Palestinians, the 
Council determined to expel Jordan from the League on 
the grounds that Jordan had contravenedthe provisions 
of the Pact and failed to fulfil its obligations under 
it.^ *^^ '^ Jordan's response was that the Council had no 
competence to deal with issues of purely legal character
(3) FACT-FINDING-o
The Pact of the Arab League neither mentioned the 
procedures of investigation, nor the power of the 
League Council to establish a fact-finding body. In 
the absence of express provisions dealing with such 
techniques, the League Council assumed a power implied 
in its broad functions of mediation under Article 5 
justifying the establishment of the necessary organs 
for the purpose of making provisions against potential 
aggression.
C47) Lenecsowski George, Op.cit. po640.
For the most part, fact finding missions established 
by the Council were charged with the dual function of 
fact-finding and conciliation. Usually the fact-finding 
v/as entrusted to the Secretary-General as in the oases 
of the Lebanese crisis of 19 58, the Kuwait situation 
of 1961, Yemen situation of 1962, the Morocco Algeria 
dispute in 1963, and the Lebanese crisis of 1958*^^^^
This procedure v/as also adopted in dealing with the 
border dispute of 1973 between North and Southern Yemen. 
This mission was chaired by an Assistant Secretary- 
General •
It would appear that such functions involved in­
vestigation of the issue in dispute between the parties 
with a view to bringing about an agreements/mutually 
acceptable terms.
THE PALESTINE; PROBLEM AND ISRAEL; -
The establishment of Israel in 1948 was the result 
of a half centuary of vigorous Zionist activities that 
led to the creation of Israeli State in Palestine. The 
movement acquired the support of non-Zionists before 
and during the Second World War as a result of the 
infamous German atrocities against Europe's Jewish 
communities. It would appear that the Zionist movements 
attempts to take over Palestine started as early as 
the end of the First World War.
In 1917 the British Government declared that they 
had bound themselves by the Balfour Declaration to
(,48) Hassouna H. Op.cito pp *19-20
support the movement for the establishment of a Jewish 
National Home in P a l e s t i n e I n  that period the 
Arabs proved to be powerless and ineffectual in the face 
of the overwhelming pressures exerted by the victorious 
Allies in their attempts to implement the Balfour 
Declaration through the League of Nations' mandate over 
Palestine «
The Arab League did its utmost after the Second
World War to frustrate the Zionist scheme for a Jewish
led
National Home in Palestine. Earlier Arab efforts tod to 
Joint Arab Conferences in 1937 and 1938, which adopted 
resolutions protesting against accelerating Jewish 
immigration to Palestine.
In 1939 the British Government invited the Governments 
of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Trans-Jordan and the Kingdom 
of Yemen to attend the London Round Table Talks on the 
deteriorating situation in Palestine. The British Government 
confirmed that any solution to the Palestine question would 
require the approval of all Arab States.
The establishment of the Arab League was at least 
partly motivated by the necessity for a joint Arab 
solution to Palestine Problem.
(,49) "Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in 
conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, the following declaration of 
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which 
have been submitted to and approved by the 
Cabinet. His Majesty's Government view with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
National Home for the Jewish People, and will 
use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, 
or any other country. I shall be grateful if you 
would bring this declaration to the knowledge 
of the Zionist Federation."
Despite the failure of the Arab League's endeavours 
to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, 
the League Council has enthusiastically continued to act 
as the Legal surrogate for all Palestine Arabs, maintaining 
a seat for them on the League Council and the Council of 
the Heads of Arab States. However, the League sponsors 
the Palestine delegation to the UN.
The Arab States refuse to recognise publicly, even 
the de facto existence of Israel as a sovereign State 
and they regard the provisional boundaries of Israel 
as temporary armistice lines under the terms of the 
1949 UN Armistice Agreements
It would appear that the establishment of Israel 
has been the main impetus for the 1950 Arab Collective 
Security Pact, but that the Joint Arab Command was 
designed to be a deterent force rather than an offensive 
weapon aimed at.Israel.
The Arab League has. endeavoured to use its argument 
against the recognition of Israel at Afro-Asian bloc
covL
conferences,^some success has been achieved since the 
1955 Bundung Conference.
The Arab League has also exploited the cold War 
between the West and East in order to secure military 
assistance from the Communist bloc, when the West 
refused to supply arms on the argument that such weapons 
would have been used against Israel.
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees are 
still living in Ü11//RA Camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria 
and Egypt. These States refused to resettle the refugees 
on the grounds that their assimilation would be against 
their own interests, since the UN has supported the 
refugees' demands to return to their homes in Palestine.
(50) Moore J.N., the Arab-Isreali conflict volume III
Documents, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
1974 pp.380-407.
At the January 1964 Arab Summit Conference in 
Cairo the Palestine Problem was intensively discussed 
with a view to solving the ill-defined Palestine entity.
In this connection, the Council of the Heads of Arab 
States entrusted this work to a committee of five 
Palestine experts under the chairmanship of the Secretary 
General •
The Committee subsequently submitted to the League 
Council a draft of the Palestine National Charter which 
was approved by common consent, in the era of good 
feeling that followed the January 1964 Arab Summit.
The Palestine Liberation Organisation was established 
on May 28th, 1964, and adopted the Palestine National 
Charter as a constitution for the PLO assuming the role 
of sole representative of the Palestinian people;as a 
matter of course this^approved by the Council of the 
Heads of Arab States at the Casablanca Summit in September 
1965.
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been the main 
controversial issue since the establishment of Israel, 
caused by the problem of who should govern these 
territories. King Abdullah of Jordan had decided to enter 
the 1948 war of Palestine with the intention of incorporat­
ing the parts allotted to the Arabs by the 1947 UN 
partition plan into his Kingdom. His efforts succeeded 
in 1950 when he officially incorporated the West Bank 
into the Kingdom of Jordan, ostensibly in trust for the 
Palestinian people.
It is also to be noted that the final Egyptian 
decision to enter the 1948 war of Palestine was adopted 
only after the Syrians informed the Egyptians of King 
Abdullah's intention. Subsequently the Egyptians set 
up a so-called Government of all Palestine in the Gaza 
Strip in 19 59 also in trust for the Palestinians which 
was approved by the Arab League then under Egyptian 
influence o
The Arab States publicly declared that they did
not intend to attack Israel while they pledged on the
other hand to recover the whole of Palestine and the
( 61)establishment of a democratic secular State in it.^ ^
In the meantimej they were acutely aware of the military
( 62)and technological superiority of Israel.^ ^
For the time being, the aims of the Arab League
were limited to the attainment of a sovereign independent
Palestine State on the West Bank, the Gaza Strin and
(6^)of course, including East Jerusalem,^ '
It must be noted that these aims implicitly accepted 
the fait accompli that the UN General Assembly Resolution 
No,181 of November 29th, 1947^^^^ gave the Jewish State 
less territory/was superseded by the settlement along 
the 1967 frontiers envisaged in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution No.242 of November 22nd, 1967.
(51) Khalidi Walid, Thinking the Unthinkable, A sovereign 
Palestinian State, Foreign Affairs Volume 56 No 4, 
1978, New York p.698.
(52) Macdonald R.W. Opocit. pp.85-94•
(53) A specialised route between the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip would be maintained through guaranteed 
freedom of an access without giving extra-territorial 
status of the route.
(54) "The north-eastern Sector of the Jewish State (Eastern 
Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the 
Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of 
Syria and Trans-Jordan. It includes the whole of the 
Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan, 
sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the 
west of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih.
From there the Jewish state extends north-west 
following one boundary described in respect of the 
Arab State.
The Beorsheca area comprises the whole of the 
Beorsheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the 
eastern nart_of the Gaza sub-district, bum excluding 
the town of Beorsheba and those areas described in 
respect of bhe Arab State. It includes also a strip 
of land along the Dead Sea stretching from Beorsheba- 
Hebron sub-district boundary line to Sin Geddi as 
described in respect of the Arab State."
I U -
Another difficulty was the presence of Israeli 
Settlements established in the occupied territories 
after 1967 war whose continued presence was undermining 
the stability of the overall settlement and would become
( 66)a ready target for criticism by international community.'' ^  
The Arab League had failed to act decisively with 
regard to boundary disputes affecting its members and 
most notably in its various clashes with Israel. Indeed 
on three major occasions in 1948, 1956 and in June 1967 
Israel had either temporarily or permanently expanded its 
territory at the expense of its Arab neighbours.
Under these circumstances Egypt adopted its own 
approach after the 1973 October War entering into peace 
negotiations with Israel whilst maintaining all the 
obligations provided for in the Security Council Resolution 
No.242 on November 1967*^^^^ Many attempts at negotiation, 
mediation, good office and conciliation, both within the 
UN and outside failed, but it would appear that the U.S. 
is the only major power capable of bringing peace to the 
Middle East.^^ ^
The Americans convinced the Egyptians to engage in 
direct negotiations with the Israelis and that led to 
the controversial visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem 
in November 1977, causing deteriorating relations between 
Egypt and all other Arab States. The culmination of the 
American, efforts led to the Summit Conférence between
Egypt Euud Israel which took place at Camp David under the 
auspices of the U.S.^^^^ Israel presented a peace plan 
for the West Banlc and the Gaza Strip proposing five
(55) Ehalidi Wald Op.cit. pp.696-708*
(56) Moore J.N. Op*cit. p.1034.
(57) Rostow, Eugene, the Illegality of the Arab Attack on 
Israel of October 6th, 1973, A.J.I.L. Volume 69, 
1975, pp.272-582.
(58) Time, September 11th, 1978 volume 112 No.11.
years' of limited -self-rule under Israeli occupation, 
together with a promise to return the whole of Sinai 
to Egyptian Sovereignty.
The problem is that Israel is unwilling so far to 
commit itself to Palestinian self-determination in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the proposed five 
years of limited self-rule under Israel occupation. 
Another problem is that neither a representative of 
the inhabitants of the territory nor the internationally 
recognised legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people would participate at the Camp David Summit.
The U.S. favoured a Palestinian homeland, remaining 
part of the Kingdom of Jordan, but King Hussein declared 
that he would not govern the West Bank again without a 
mandate from the Arab League to do so.^^^^
Subsequently a Summit of the Heads of Arab States 
was held in Baghdad in November 1978 which unanimously 
rejected the Camp David accords. Appealing to Egypt to 
renounce the ■■Accord, the Summit also determined that 
Egypt would remove itself from the Arab Camp if it 
failed to respond.
Subsequently, another conference took place in 
Washington, aimed at producing an Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty along the lines of the Camp David framework.
This seemed close to success but was vitiated initially 
by Israel rejection of the treaty text. When the Israel 
Cabinet eventually accepted the terms on 26th November 
1978 i.e. after the resolution of Baghdad Summit it 
was Egypt's turn to baulk.
In order not to appear to have succumbed to the 
pressure of the Baghdad summit, yet unable to severe 
her ties with the other Arab countries Egypt adopted
(59) Middle East Events, September 8th, 1978 No.51 
published in London.
(60) Middle East Events, November 17th, 1978 No*56*
the face saving formula of maintaining reservation over 
article 4 and 6 of the Treaty^ ^ ^\vhilst simultaneously 
demanding greater precision concerning provisions for 
eventual Palestinian Self-rule /
Thus the peace in Middle East is still at stake. 
Reviewing the Palestine Problem, which beset the Arab 
League from its very inception, it could be considered 
prime example of the ineffectuality of the League in 
the defence of Arab interests.
THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR:-
The existing Lebanese State v/as founded on a French 
formula, based on a sectarian system. Since the French 
Maxidate ended in 1943, parliamentary seats, high offices 
and positions in the administration were allocated to 
the sects in proportion to their numbers.
The system favoured the Christians slightly, in 
particular the Maronites who held the presidency, as 
against the Sunni premiership.
The French formula was the basis, both for the 
sovereign independence of Lebanon and its special 
relationship vm th other Arab countries. The Arab League 
adopted a resolution at the Alexandria Conference 
concerning Lebanon, emphasising its respect for the
(61) Article 4 of the treaty is concerned with the Security 
arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula after Israeli 
withdrawal and the presence of the Utï troops on the 
border between Egyptian and Israeli forces.
Article 6 commits Egypt to consider its obligations 
under the Peace Treaty with Israel as overriding 
any Egyptian obligations undertaken in the 19 50 Arab 
Collect i've Security Pact with other Arab Nations.
(62) Middle East Events - December 29th, 1978 No. 59.
(63) Al-Tahar Hamdi, the Lebanon's Political System, the 
Universal Press, Cairo (Egypt) 1976 (Arabic Text) 
pp.157-170.
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its existing 
frontiers
The most controversial issue of the present Lebanese 
Civil War centres around the Palestinians. They had first 
entered Lebanon as refugees in 1948 and were distributed 
in Camps throughout the country.
The Palestine Liberation Organisation established on 
May 28th, 1964 under the initiative of the Arab League 
at the January 1964 Arab Summit Conference in Cairo, 
established its Headquarters in Beirut. This became a 
visible danger to the Lebanese authorities, particularly, 
the Christian Maronites•
The first major clash 'between the Lebanese authorities 
and the PLO occurred on April 14th, 1969 in southern 
Lebanon, wh^^the Lebanese army endeavoured to assert 
Lebanon's sovereignty in that area, with a view to removing 
any pretext for Israeli incursions into Lebanon. Meanwhile 
the PLO was gaining wide support from the Arab League.
In these circumstances, the famous Cairo Agreement was 
concluded between the Lebanese Government and the PLO 
on November 3rd, 1969 on the initiative of the Arab 
League, regulating the presence of the PLO in Lebanon 
and allowing the PLO autonomy in the Camps and in the 
southern border regions.^^^^
The Arab League failure to impose a solution on the 
Civil War in Jordan, in September 1970, intensified the 
Christian Maronites fears of the Palestinians, at the 
very time when the PLO were losing their confrontation 
with King Hussein and were falling back into Lebanon.
In the meantime the Christians began to arm themselves 
for what they perceived as an inevitable conflict in 
which they could not depend on the Arab League.
(64) The Alexandria Protocol, Pact of the League of Arab 
States, Published by the Arab League, Cairo N.B. p.6.
(65) Hudson Michael C. The Palestinian Factor in the 
Lebanese Civil War, Middle Last Journal, Summer 1978, 
Volume 32 Washington po.261-278.
-oz-
The Lebanese army made great efforts to break- the 
power of the PLO in the Palestinian Camps and in the 
southern region, but the fighting led to defeat for the 
army / ^
Under these circumstances the Arab League initiated 
the conclusion of a new agreement between the Lebanese 
Government and the PLO on May 17th, 1973. This imposed 
restrictions upon the movements of the PLO, but like 
the Cairo agreement before it, it did not bring about 
a final solution of the Lebanese civil war. Despite 
Palestinian declaration of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of Lebanon, their involvement in the 
Civil War became unavoidable because of the total 
collapse of central authority.
The blockade of the Palestinian Camps in January 
1976 by Cbristian rightists brought about a major change 
in the overall Palestinian position and set the stage for 
full Palestinian involvement. The PLO were finally brought 
directly in the Lebanese c o n f l i c t . T h i s  led to a 
formidable coalition with the Lebanese Sunnis and even 
since there has been significant Palestinian support 
for the Lebanese leftist organisations. The rightist 
Leader declared that the struggle was now one between 
the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites and 
the Palestians. They also stated that they would talie 
all the necessary steps to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty 
against the Palestinian threat.
Initially Syria ignored the Arab League and adopted 
its own approach attempting mediation between the PLO 
and the Christian Maronites, with a view to bringing 
about reconciliation based on an agreement on mutually 
acceptable terms. The Syrian proposal of February 1976,
(66) The Middle East, September 1978 No*47.
(67) Middle East, Sentember 1978 Ho.47 r
endorsed by President Franjiyah in principle, provided 
for a return to the 1943 formula laid down by the 
Mandatory Power, but with some modification in favour of 
the Muslims. The Lebanese leftist organisations however, 
maintained that the Syrian proposal did not bring about 
any significant change in the Lebanese situation. It 
was inadequate because it did not contain economic 
reforms /
Subsequently, the Arab League also assumed a 
mediatory role, and the Secretary-General was shuttling 
between Beirut, Damascus and various Arab capitals, 
with a view to persuading the involved parties to call 
a ceasefire and bring about a peaceful settlement. It 
would appear that his role intended to be investigatory 
with a view to bringing about an agreement between the 
concerned parties upon mutually acceptable terms.
The Secretary-General's mediatory role failed as a 
result of the existing differences among the Arab League 
member States. Since 1973 the stability of the Arab 
World has been shattered by broad wrangling over the 
first disengagement agreement on the Egyptian front.
Relations between Cairo and Damascus became strained, 
and there were also differences between Egypt and Iraq, 
Egypt and Libya, Egypt and Algeria and Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia•
All these circumstances did not help the Secretary- 
General in pursuing his initiative to bring about 
adequate solutions to Lebanese Civil War*^^^)
In the final stage the entry of regular Syrian 
troops on June 1976 also brought about a major change in 
the overall Lebanese Civil War, in general reducing the
(,68) Stoakes Frank, the Civil War in Lebanon, the World
Today, volume 32, 1976, the Broadwater Press, Welwyn 
Garden City, Hertfordshire, pp.8-17,
(69) Al-Tahar Hamdi, OpoCit* pp.485-490f
autonomy of the PLO, followed by Syrian tilting in favour 
of the Christian rightists.
The Syrian troops directly clashed with the PLO and 
Lebanese leftist organisations and the Muslim Sunnis, 
and Palestinian administered areas came gradually under 
Syrian control. By September 1976 Syrian troops were 
pushing the PLO and the Lebanese leftists organisations 
out of their positions in the Lebanese mountains and 
also in the south.
In October 1976 a mini Arab Summit Conference of 
the Heads of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria 
and the PLO was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It produced 
a peace formula and the decision to send an Arab League 
peace-keeping force to Lebanon, drawing personnel from 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan and from the Syrian troops which were 
already stationed there. The function of these troops 
is to maintain peace and security until the legitimate 
national force will be able to take over this task.^^^^
Despite all this the peace in Lebanon is still at 
stake. Renewed fighting flared up over the presence 
of the Syrian dominated Arab League peace-keeping forces 
this time leading to the 1978 clashes between Syrian 
troops and the Christian rightists militias.
THE SAHARA PROBLEM; -
The disposition of the Western Sahara has already 
had dramatic effects on World order. Some sixty thousand 
Sahrawis have become refugees, adding additional strain 
onto the facilities and the budget of the UN High
070) Middle East Events, September 1978 No.51*
(71) Turner Louis and Bedore James, Saudi Arabia:- 
The Power of the Purse-string, International 
Affairs Volume No.54, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1978. p.410.
(,72) The Guardian Tuesday January 9th, 1979*
Commissioner for refugees.
The Western Sahara is situated along the Atlantic
coast of northwest Africa, is a part of the Arab world.
It was a Spanish colony handed over under the Madrid
( 73)Agreement to be partitioned by Morocco and
Mauritania.
The Madrid Agreement illegally ignored the UN 
General Assembly Resolutions, calling on Spain to 
implement the Sahara's right to self-determination.
From the beginning, the question of the Spanish Sahara 
had been exhaustively discussed in the Special Committee 
of the UN General Assembly since September 1963 and in 
the General Assembly plenary session since December of 
that year.
The twenty-first Session of the General Assembly 
in,1966 re-affirmed the right of the people of the 
Spanish Sahara to self-determination and in the mean­
time, asked the Secretary-General to appoint and send to 
the Sahara a special mission for the purpose of re­
commending practical steps for the implementation of the 
UN General Assembly's Resolutions. Indeed all six 
Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between 
1967 and 1973 echo the prescriptions of the 1966 
Resolution•
On the other hand the OAU strongly emphasised the 
rule, that territories must exercise their right to 
self-determination within established colonial boundaries. 
It is for these reasons that African states have observed 
that each colony in the final stage of decolonization 
must exercise its rights of self-determination within 
the confines of established boundaries.
(.73) Moroccan authorities claimed to see injustice in 
restricting such vast resources to a tiny 
population and privately said that one Kuwait 
in the Arab World was enough.
(74) Thomas M* Franck, the Stealing of the Sahara,
A.J.I.L. volume 79, 1976, pp.696-717*
This concept had already been applied in the 
Arab World after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
when the Arab World was partitioned into British 
and French zones. In due course each zone in the final 
Stage of the Mandates exercised its right of self- 
determination within the confines of established 
boundaries.'' ,
From the beginning, Morocco actually took the 
initiative in proposing that the Sahara and other 
Spanish Colonies should as soon as possible, be granted 
their independence, but subsequently Morocco privately 
indicated that the Salirawis were limited to a choice 
between union with Morocco or remaining a Spanish colony, 
thus excluding the option of independence *
On July 8th, 1976 King Hassan publicly asserted 
Morocco’s historic claim to the Sahara and threatened 
to use armed force to gain these territories. Morocco 
suddenly proposed that the issue be referred to the 
10J to examiine the validity of Morocco’s claim to 
historic title. Mauritania did not join the call for 
submitting the case to the 10J re-iterating its intent 
to respect the freely expressed will of the Sahrawis.
Subsequently King Hassan and President Ould Baddah 
held a summit meeting in Rabat, where Mauritania eventually 
agreed to go to the 10J . It would however, appear that 
they also produced a partition plan of the Sahara, 
regardless of the outcome of the Oourt’s advisory 
opinion
(75) Khadduri M. Op.cit. p*758o
(76) Middle East Events, January 12th, 1979 No*60.
The General Assembly's Fourth Committee adopted
a Resolution on December 11th, 1975, requesting an
advisory opinion of the 10J which the General Assembly 
( 77)approved M ^
The Court concluded that the rules applicable to 
decolonization require respect for the rights of the 
population of Western Sahara to determine their future 
political status by their own freely expressed will*
The Court definitely ruled that neither Morocco nor 
Mauritania have a valid claim to the Sahara based on 
historic title
Subsequently after the 10J published its advisory 
opinion the Moroccan Government announced that there 
would be a massive march of unarmed civilians from 
Morocco into the Sahara to gain recognition of Morocco's 
right to the Western Sahara.
On November 1st, 1976, Spain requested a meeting 
of the Security Council and ultimately declared that 
it would defend Sahara territory with military force, 
if necessary.
Unfortunately, the U.S. and France, however, 
prevented the UN Security Council from reaching decision 
ordering King Hassan to call off the march and to re­
affirm the right of the people of the Western Sahara 
to self-determination*
(.77) The Special Committee of the General Assembly appointed 
representatives from Cuba, Iran and Ivory Coast to 
constitute the mission of the UN to be despatched to 
the Sahara in accordance with the UN General 
Assembly's Resolution of 13th December, 1975. The 
mission was charged with responsibility for securing 
information on the situation prevailing in the Sahara, 
The mission concluded after visiting the territory 
that the majority of the population within the 
Spanish Sahara were in favour of independence.
(78) Report of ICJ, Report Ho.2, 1975, pt>.166-174,
39-42, 9 and 12.
The handover of the Sahara was a wrong committed 
in a hurry while General Franco was dying and under 
pressure from the U.S.A. Spain agreed under the Madrid 
Agreement of November 14th, 1976 to allow the Sahara to 
be partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania. Ever 
since, there has 'been fighting in the Sahara between both 
Morocco and Mauritania on the one hand and the POLISARIO 
which/^internationally recognised as the Legitimate 
representative of the Sahara people on the other hand. 
Luring the 3 years which Morocco and Mauritania 
have been fighting the POLISARIO, Mauritania have been 
defeated and since the coup d'etat in July 1978 the new 
regime have been trying to negotiate a settlement directly 
with the POLISARIO* Morocco are neither losing nor 
winning. Th,ey can move about in the Sahara an.d operate 
the phosphate mines only under heavy military protection, 
whilst POLISARIO have recently been penetrating farther 
into southern Morocco itself which is suffering grave 
economic hardship as a result of the war*^^^)
The Spanish policy has also been changed since the 
Madrid Agreement. The most important switch is that the 
ruling Centre Democratic Union has formally recognised 
POLISARIO as the only legitimate representative of the 
struggling Sahara people*
In a speech to the UN General Assembly on October 
2nd, 1978 the Spanish Foreign Minister urged a rapid 
negotiation settlement of the three-year old Sahara war 
and said that this should be based on the right of the 
Sahara people to free self-determination
In this case the Arab League merely addressed a 
conciliatory plea to restore peace, to the parties in 
the dispute, leaving it to them to negotiate a peaceful
(79) The Observer 24th December 1978.
(80) Middle East Events December 15th, 1978 No.8.
settlement, while in the Kuwait-Iraq dispute of 1961 
the Arab League rejected Iraq's territorial claim upon 
Kuv/ait and adopted effective measures for the preservation 
of Kuwait'8 independence.
The Arab League failed to preserve the independence 
of the Western Sahara as a result of the differences 
among the Arab States.
Since 1973 the Arab World has been shattered by (oi&E-
spj-<sac\
wrangling over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Lebanese Civil war. Nonetheless, it would appear 
that Morocco and Mauritania have violated their obligations 
under the Pact of the Arab League, when they on purpose 
violated the territorial integrity of Western Sahara.
In accordance with Article 18 of the Pact, the League
Council adopt appropriate measures against Morocco
and Mauritania because they failed to fulfil their 
obligations under the Pact.
Such measures involve loss of the right to the
privileges and immunities of membershipJ moreover, it 
will involve the deprivation of a memberk representation 
as well as their votes in any organs of the Arab League, 
(vide Article 5, 8 and 18 of the Pact of the Arab 
League.)
EKTEmAL POLICY;-
THE ARAB INDEPENDENCE MOVEI.ENT;-
The Arab League has been promoting independence for 
all Arab peoples acting as a forum in which common policies 
were being formulated. "The area in which the co-operation 
has been most effective is that of co-ordinating policies 
in relation to third States, on issues such as the complaints 
against France over the Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian
questions, or against the U.K. over the Southern Yemen 
and Oman or in relation to the blockade against Israel.
In its policy of promoting political independence 
for dependent Arab countries, the Arab League co-operates 
with Afro-Asian bloc in the Ul'i. From the beginning, 
representatives of the North African dependencies were 
allowed to participate at Alexaidria Conference with 
observer status. They also attended the ceremonies of 
the League's establishment in March 1945.
The Pact of the Arab League furthermore provides for 
co-operation with and assistance to Arab countries which 
are not members of the League.
The Arab League made direct contact with Mandatory 
Powers such as Great Britain and France, in its role, 
in some instance, as trustee for the dependent Arab 
territories.
Member States of the Arab League acted through 
established diplomatic channels to gain sympathy for 
the Arab cause as for example when, the Arab League 
requested the Western Powers in 1959 at the NATO Summit 
not to support France in her military campaign in Algeria.
The representatives of the League member States at 
the Ui'T always endeavour to gain the support of the Afro- 
Asian bloc and other powers in favour of establishing 
investigating commissions by the UN Security Council 
or the General Assembly to be sent to dependent Arab 
territories S
Since 1945 the number of independent Arab States 
has risen from seven to twenty. There is still the problem
of the setting up of an independent Western Sahara State,
and the Palestinian state in the 7/est Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, both of whom, it is hoped will take their seats in 
the Arab League in the nearest future.
(81) Bowett B.V/., the Law of International Institutions, 
Stevens & Sons, London 1976, p.205.
(82) Macdonald R.',7. On.cit. pn.94-96»
00-OPERAT I ON WITH THE
Co-operation with the UN started with the League's 
approach, referring the open conflict with France the 
former Mandatory Power of Syria and Lebanon, to the 
UN Security Council, when a peaceful settlement in 
favour of the independence of Syria and Lebanon was 
achieved in April 1946.
The Political Department of the League Secretariat 
was made responsible for the co-operation and unification 
of the policies of the Arab States in advance of UN 
meetings. The effectiveness of this can be seen at all 
the UN meetings, where the Arab States act as an influential
bloc.(83)
The first opportunity the Arab States had to show 
their unity v/as at the UN Conference at San Francisco 
in April 1945, and since 19 51 the Secretary-General of 
the Arab League has been a regular and official observer 
at the JM General Assembly Sessions.
The Arab League has actively supported and encouraged 
the development of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN which 
now dominates the General Assembly.
The Arab League states have enthusiastically sought 
to enlarge the operational scope of the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) and of other UN Specialised 
Agencies dealing with the acceleration of developments 
in the developing countries.
Formal instruments of co-operation have been con­
cluded with various specialised Agencies such as the 
WHO, mo, ILO and UNESCO.(85)
(83) Bowett D.W. Op.eit. p.205.
(84) Seton-Williams M.V. Britain and the Arab States 
Luzac & Co. Ltd., London 1948, p.233*
(85) Macdonald R.W. OpoCito pp.102-105.
AFRO-ASIAN SOLDARITY;-
The Arab League has been promoting diplomatic 
co-operation with Afro-Asian countries since its 
establishment. The major result of this is the existence 
of a voting bloc in the UN. General Assembly.
The Arab League has supported the Afro-Asian 
countries on various occasions starting with active 
support for the Indonesian independence movement in 
1946. It attempted to mediate the Kashmir dispute 
between India and Pakistan, constantly supported Vietnam's 
independence movement and independence for Cyprus.
The Secretary-General of the Arab League participated 
in the New Delhi Conference of Afro-Asian nations in 
January 1949, where agreement upon a common Afro-Asian 
policy to be co-ordinated in advance of Uï\ General 
Assembly sessions was reached.
In December 19 52 a special Afro-Asian bloc meeting 
was held in Cairo under Arab League auspices to co-ordinate 
and unify a coiiimon Afro-Asian policy on the situation in 
North Africa.
At the Bandung Conference in December 1954 the Arab 
League played a significant role to place the Palestine 
question on the conference agenda along with other 
World problems such as racial discrimination, the fight 
against colonization, human rights, the regulations of 
armaments and the use of atomic energy.' ^
The Arab League always recommends to the Arab states 
to strengthen their diplomatic representations in the 
Afro-Asian countries
(86) Rafai Muhammed Ali Op.eit. pp.307-309o
(87) Ibid pp.315-317.
(88) Rafi. Muhammed Ali Op.eit. pp.310-313-
(89) Macdonald R.W. op.eit. pp.96-98.
NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY;-
The Arab League rejected the American initiative 
for a regional security pact in the Middle East that 
would represent an extension of NATO.^^^^ It had been 
advocating a policy of neutralism during the Cold War 
between the East and West, thus for instance, the Arab 
delegates at the UN abstained from voting on the Uniting 
for Peace Resolutions of 19 50 concerning the Korean 
War.
The Arab League non-alignment policy has been 
successful in that it permits greater freedom of 
action and also greater influence in the UN
ARAB BOYCOTT.; -
Members of the Arab League have been engaged in a 
boycott against Israel since the establishment of the 
Arab League in 1945* Under the terms of Resolution 16 
of the League Council in December 1945, all members of 
the Arab League agreed to boycott goods produced by 
Zionist firms in Palestine. The purposes of the boycott 
are intended to prevent Arab States and non Arab States 
from making direct or indirect contribution to Israel's 
economic and military strength.
The Arab States ban their own citizens and foreign 
companies situated in their territories from exporting 
to Israel products manufactured in an Arab country or 
of transshipping products to Israel via an Arab country, 
and also to foreign companies who established factories 
or branches in Israel are banned from selling or operating 
in the Arab States.
C90) Al-Ghanami M.T. the UN and the Specialised Agencies,
Atlas Press, Cairo 1971 (Arabic Texf) pol037*
(91) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. pp.105-118*
It was not until 1950, two years after Israel became 
independent that the boycott was extended to involve the 
refusal of Arab States to trade with third parties which 
were considered by the boycott committee of the Arab 
League as significantly contributing to Israel's economic 
and military strength.
For these purposes, the Arab League established a 
Central Boycott Office in Damascus in 1951 which operates 
as a Secretariat-General for the local boycott offices 
set up in the Arab countries and for the Sami-annual 
Regional Conferences which pass recommendations to the 
Arab Governments.
The blacklist is the principal instrument for the 
enforcement of the boycott'  ^ but recommendations of the 
CBO are not binding on any Arab League member, although 
it is generally agreed that no Arab country has seriously 
proposed discontinuing the boycott even when the internal 
relations between the Arab States are at their worst.
There are exceptions made in order to avoid harming 
Arab economies in the name of the boycott. Over the 
years the CBO has established such exceptions to the 
basic principles such as that the boycott does not apply 
to governmental sales through which Arab countries can
(92) Since 1951 a various American and Western European 
Companies have been blacklisted by the Arab League, 
because of business relations with Israel: e.g. 
Coca-oola was blacklisted in 1966, six months 
after licensing a bottling plant in Israel,
Ford Motor Company which licenses a truck and 
tractor assembly plant in Israel was also black­
listed in the same year. In 1957 the Arab League 
announced a political important boycott against 
France as a result of her military campaign in North 
Africa.. This involved banning Air France from 
overflight and landing rights within the territories 
of Arab League members. In 1959 a similar case against 
Renault the French automobile company led to the 
cancellation of Renault's plan to establish an 
assembly plant in Israel.
(93) Al-Ghanami M.T. Op.eit. pp.1039-1043*
purchase military equipment from the same companies 
that supply Israel.
The boycott v/as also applied at the political level. 
In 1957 attempts were made to dissuade Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Bulgaria from trading with Israel. Relations 
with Turkey have been strained over her commercial ties 
with Israel. As a result of the League's co-operative 
policy with Afro-Asian countries some Asian States 
refuse even to recognise Israel e.g. India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Afghanistan. On the other hand it had been 
unsuccessful in persuading newly established African 
States to call off Israeli technical assistance and 
commercial ties.
Despite that failure the Arab League can be given 
credit for the cancellation of joint ventures in the 
shipping field between Israel and Sierra Leone and Ghana.
The Arab boycott is not an act of revenge or 
aggression but a defensive protective one. It is applied 
by many States e.g. by the U.S. banning trade with Cuba.
lO
Vietnam, Great Britain Rhodesia. It is an inter­
national custom. The Arab boycott is not based on any 
racial or religious discrimination. The Arab States 
have dealings with companies owned by Jews who do not 
support Israel. The Arab States are careful not to harm 
the interests of foreign companies and for this reason 
the CBO contacts the companies which have relations with 
Israel to discover the nature of those relations. No 
action is taken against the Company unless these relations 
prove to strengthen Israel's economic and military 
capability, if that seems to be the case the company'is 
asked to choose between the Arabs and Israel.
(94) Turck Nancy, the Arab Boycott of Israel foreign 
affairs, An American Quarterly Review, October 
1976 volume 55 No.l Washington pp.472-478.
(95) Macdonald Op.eit. pp.118-123.
—INTERNAL POLICY;-
RIVALRY FOR LEADERSHIP OP THE ARAB LEAGUE:-
The rivalry between Iraq and Egypt over leadership 
of the Arab League has been demonstrated on a number of 
occasions# Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact in 19 55 
was a major controversial issue demonstrating the differences 
between the two countries which v/ealiened the Arab League.
On the other hand, Iraq generally alleged Egyptian domination 
of the Arab League and its use of the League as an instrument 
of Egyptian policy.
The basic conflict between the Hashemites and Egypt 
stemmed from the differences over action in Palestine.
It should be noted that the disputes between Iraq and 
Egypt did pot cease with the overthrow the Hashemite 
monarchy in Iraq in 1958.
Jordanian complaints in 19 50 of Egyptian domination 
of the Arab League stemmed from the Egyptian Campaign to 
expel Jordan from the Arab League when King Abdullah 
incorporated the West Bank into his domain.
The North African members of the Arab League have 
had their own grudges against Egypt. For instance Tunisia 
in 1958 complained of Egyptian domination of the League 
by modelling its policies on those of Egypt without 
consulting member States.
The breakdown of the 1958 union between Syria and 
Egypt in 1962 led to a major dispute between the two 
countries, indeed at the meeting of the League Council 
to hear the Syrian complaints, the Egyptian delegation 
threatened withdrawal from the Arab League if the 
Council pursued its hearing of complaints against 
Egypt.
(,96) Lencsowski George Op.eit. pp.638-639»
(97) Bowett D.W. Op.cito p.204.
The rivalry between the Saudi and the Hashemite 
royal houses influenced the League Council proceedings 
until 1956, when the two sides agreed to settle their 
differences in accordance with the same terms as the 
Saudi-Iraqi treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance of 
1936.(98)
During the early years of the Arab League and 
whilst the Saudi/Hashemite rift persisted, close co­
operation existed between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in all 
Arab League institutions.
This changed drastically after Egyptian intervention 
in the internal affairs of the Yemen. Strained relations 
continued until after the death of Nasser, when Egypt 
adopted a new policy and ceased its intervention*
The new members of the Arab League have tended to 
form a neutralist bloc between Egypt and Iraq . The 
polâaization of power seems to narrow the range of 
action of the Arab League, but there have been agreements 
on some fundamental Arab League issues e.g. Egypt's 
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 19 56 was supported 
by Iraq.(^^)
There has been a long record of competition among 
rival Arab States to use the Palestine issue against each 
other and for their own advantages, beginning with the 
disastrous military campaign in Palestine in 1948.
This competition was mainly between Egjqjt on the one 
hand and the two Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq 
on the other hand, in order to win general influence in 
the Arab world. The final Egyptian decision to invade 
Palestine came only in 1948, only after the Syrians 
informed the Egyptians that King Abdullah of Jordan 
had decided to enter and occupy the Arab part of 
Palestine.
(98) Seton-Williams Op.eit. p.218.
(99) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. pp.73-82.
The recent approach of the Egyptian Government which 
seems to have secured Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian 
territory occupied after the 1967 war, stemmed from 
discovering the extent of Egypt's own importance and 
led them to offer significant concessions and guarantee 
to Israel that would have been unthinkable at any previous 
time since the establishment of Israel.
THE DECISION-MlAKING PROCESS; -
According to the Pact of the Arab League the decision 
making process and policy making are exercised by the 
League Council. The Council consists of the representatives 
of all member States of the League and a representative 
from Palestine.
The Council meets in ordinary sessions twice a year, 
but may be convened in emergency session at the request 
of two members.. The Council sessions are usually held 
in Cairo, where the Headquarters of the League are 
situated* It may however, assemble at any place it may 
designate within its jurisdiction. Chairmanship of the 
League Counci], is held in rotation by the member states 
in alphabetical order.
Voting procedures for the League Council are 
established by the Pact of the Arab League. Substantial 
matters must be approved by unanimous vote, in order 
that the decision may bind all members while majority 
decisions bind only those members which accept them.
Procedural and administrative matters require only 
a majority vote of the League Council and are generally 
specified by the pact of the Arab League. Amendment of 
the League Pact requires a two-thirds majority.^^^^)
(100) Hammond Y.P. & Alexander 8.S. Political Dynamic 
in the Middle East, American Elsewier Publishing 
Co., New York 1972, pp.63-66.
(101) Macdonald R.W. Op*cit. pp.56-61.
Outside the League Council voting procedures 
in other organs of the Arab League are noxmally by 
simple majority with the exception of the Joint 
Defense Council which requires the two-third majority.
The Economic Council and the Technical Committees 
except the Political Committee are consultative bodies 
and usually serve to recommend actions to the League 
Council for making decisions
According to the Pact of the Arab League,, disputes 
which may arise between member States shall be referred 
to the League Council.. The decision of the Council in 
these instances is enforcable upon the disputing member 
States.
The Council shall mediate in any dispute which may 
lead to a war between two member States or between a 
member State or a non-member State. Decisions relating 
to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by a 
majority. In case of aggression or a threat of aggression 
the member States may request an immediate meeting of 
the League Council, which shall decide by an unanimous 
vote upon the measures to be taken against the aggressor. 
If that aggressor were a member State of the League, 
the vote of such State shall not be considered in 
determining the unanimity required in voting upon such 
a matter. The 19 50 Arab Collective Security Pact provides 
for a Joint Defense Council and appropriate military 
agencies to deal with aggression from inside and outside 
the region. The 19 50 Pact, however, affirms that the 
contracting States shall consider an attack against one 
member as an attack against all.
THE POLICY-flAKING PROCESS: -
The League Secretariat-General is only given 
administrative and executive functions as stipulated
(102) Al-Ghanami T.M. Op.eit. pp.1029-1031.
by the Pact of the Arab League. It plays, however, an 
important role in the policy-making process since it is 
entrusted with long range studies for ultimate consider­
ation by the League Council and with preparing the Agendas 
for the League Council and the Council of the Heads of 
Arab States. There are also expert advisors who deal with 
technical matters and reports directly to the Secretariat- 
General .
The Political Committee in practice fulfils the 
functions of the League Council under the actual operating 
condition. It consists of foreign ministers of the member 
States, but sometimes is made up of Arab diplomatic 
representatives to the Arab League. It is charged with 
drawing up recommendations for the League Council. It 
meets usually before League Council Sessions and in the 
meantime it is entrusted to debate the recommendations 
of the Technical Committees before these are being 
submitted to the League Council. Voting in the Political 
Committee is by simple majority, decisions are then 
drafted as resolutions and are then submitted to the 
League Council for a p p r o v a l T h e  Political Committee 
usually acts as the principal body in the policy-rmaking 
process of the Arab League, while the League Council is a 
decision-making body,^^^^)
It must be understood, however, that the representatives 
of member States on the League Council, do not wield 
individual authority to make decisions. This is retained 
by the member governments whom the representatives must 
refer back to before casting a vote or entering into a 
binding obligation. Similarly, Council decisions affect 
citizens of member States only through the medium of their 
own governments, never directly.
(103) Al-Ghanami T.M. Op.eit. pp.1031-1033.
(104) Macdonald H.7/. Op.eit. pp.61-67.
CO-OPERiYTION WITH TI-IS M ;-
One of the major tasks entrusted to the Arab League 
Council was to collaborate "with the international 
organisations which might be created in the future to 
guarantee peace and security and organise economic and 
social r e l a t i o n s . U n d e r  these circumstances, the 
Arab League member States at the UN. Conference of 
International Organisation submitted a copy of the Arab 
League Pact to the Secretariat of the Conference, which 
was subsequently distributed to the delegates of the 
participant States as an official document. The Arab 
and Latin American delegations, at San Francisco 
Conference, worked closely together in an effort to 
attain de jure recognition of both the Arab League and 
the organisation of American States as regional agencies, 
and proposed to.have them named in the text of the U7i 
Charter.
Nevertheless neither the Arab League nor the 
organisation of American States were recognised by the 
UN Charter, nor did the UN specify policies or procedures 
with which to integrate the activities of the regional 
organisations with the Ul(f. Subsequently the Arab League 
and the organisation of American States attained de facto 
acceptance by the UN as regional organisations within 
the meaning of Chapter VIII of the XM Charter.
In 19 50 the Syrian delegate to the UN requested 
the UN Secretary-General to place on the agenda of the 
UN General Assembly the matter of a permanent invitation 
to the Arab League Secretary-General to attend sessions 
of the General Assembly. The UN Secretary-General submitted 
the Syrian request to the legal Committee of the General
(l) Article 3 of the Pact of the Arab League.
Assembly. It was fully discussed by the Committee, 
which prepared a draft resolution calling for the 
invitation, and the matter was referred to the General 
Assembly.
The General Assembly approved the recommendation of
the Legal Committee and requested the ITN Secretary-
General to invite the Arab League Secretary-General
to attend the Sixth UN General Assembly Session. "Since
then, the invitation has been extended for each session,
upon which the Secretary-General attends the meeting in
( 2)
his capacity of observer,"' ' The League Secretary- 
General informed the General Assembly at its Sixth 
Session that the Arab League looked forward to closer 
collaboration with the UN and its specialised Agencies, 
especially in the social, economic and cultural fields.
In practice, relations between the UN and the 
Arab League have gradually been developed over the years 
Since 1950 the UN Secretary-General and the Arab League 
Secretary-General have been engaged in negotiations on 
several occasions in efforts to establish the basic 
principles for a formal agreement between the UN and 
the Arab League.
On December 21st, I960, the UN Secretary-General 
transmitted to the Arab League Secretary-General a 
"Memorandum" meant to serve as a guide for future co­
operation and liaison between the UN and the Arab 
L e a g u e . T h e  memorandum contains principles on such 
matters as mutual consultation for the co-ordination of 
common activities, joint actions, particularly projects 
of an economic, social or humanitarian characters,
(2) Hussouna Hussein A. The League of Arab States and 
Regional Disputes, Ocean Publication Inc. New York 
1975 p.12.
(3) Letter of the UN Secretary-General to the League 
Secretary-General on December I960, Hussouna Hussein 
Op.eit. p.441 (Appendix P).
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(4)
It also set forth procedures on mutual exchanges of 
Information and documentation and representation and 
liaison, in accordance with the terms of Resolution 
477 of November 1st, 1950 of the UN General Assembly.
It should be noted here, that the memorandum of the 
UI(T Secretary-General is not an agreement between the two 
organisations, because the UN has no agreements on co­
operation with inter-governmental organisations such as 
the Arab League. There is, however, no doubt that the 
memorandum does constitute de facto recognition of 
the Arab League as a regional agency within the meaning 
of the UN Charter
From the beginning, the League Secretary-General 
decided to designate the Political Department of the 
League Secretariat as the principal organs of the Arab 
League to deal with matters concerning the Ulf. Other 
departments of the League Secretariat have assumed 
responsibilities for co-^ordinating cOinmon activities 
with the UN, particularly the departments of Palestine, 
Economic and Cultural and Social affairs.
Subsequently, the League Secretary-General decided 
to establish a liaison staff with the UN under the 
chairmanship of Assistant Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs.
The Arab League has endeavoured to co-ordinate its 
activities within the framework of the M  to accomplish
uhe irfufoatLci.xon bl iirabib ah'an oSxl’cia.L rahguage-s is
7)
C7)
the UN an.d a number of its Specialised Agencies.'^) of
the UN an.d a number of its Specialised Agencies.
(4) Memorandum on co-operation and liaison between the 
UN and the Arab League of December 21st, 1950, 
Hussouna Hussein Op.eit. p.443 (Appendix F).
(5) Akehurst Michael, Enforcement Action by Regional 
Agencies with Special Reference to the Organisation 
of American states. The British Year Book of 
International Law, volume 42, Oxford University 
Press, London 1967 p.179.
(6) Abu-Baker Yehia Op.eit, p.90.
(.7) Hassouna Hussein Op.eit, p.ll.
For the most part, contacts between the UN and 
the Arab League have been on an ad hoc basis. In this 
connection, contacts between the two S.ccretaries-General 
have been usually unofficial. The League Secretary- 
General sometimes transmits to the UN. Secretary-General 
copies of certain League Council resolutions, however, 
the League Secretariat has not, frequently, received 
acknowledgement of the receipt of such resolution.
THE ARAB LEAGUE FIBMBER STATES AT THE UN; -
In principle, during the past years, the Arab League 
has been active in the diplomatic field, particularly in 
the UN., where a united front was presented by the Arab 
League member S t a t e s . T h i s  couJLS b.e attributed to 
the official resolutions of the League Council. Once a 
decision has been made in the proper organ of the UN, 
the permanent representatives of the League member States 
to the UN are informed and in due course appropriate 
actions are taken. In the event of the permanent 
representatives of the League member States having 
different views on a certain matter, the Arab League 
Liaison staff may direct each member State to make 
representatives to appropriate diplomatic missions 
visiting the appropriate authorities in the various 
Arab capitals in an effort to gain support for a united 
Arab front.
In the meantime, Arab diplomatic missions abroad 
endeavour to secure support in the foreign ministeries 
of the world. The permanent representatives of the Arab
(■8) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. pp.244-249.
(9) International Organisations, Vol^ame 1 Boston 1947 
p.155.
League member States engage in canvassing before important 
issues that come before the General Assembly's sessions, 
concentrating particularly on the Afro-Asian bloc to 
secure v o t e s . T h e  last resort has been the convocation 
of an extra-ordinary session of the League Council at the 
Foreign Ministers level in New York during the General 
Assembly session.
The Arab League Secretary-General is often present 
for at least part of each General Assembly session. After 
his departure Arab League permanent observer at the UN 
takes his place.
In any case, the Arab League permanent observer 
to the UN has no voting right in any organ, but he is 
entrusted with the task of seeing that the Arab League 
policies are implemented. This could be demonstrated by 
means of weekly or occasional meetings between the 
representatives of the Arab League member States and the 
permanent observer at the UN, particularly during the 
annual sessions of the General '.Assembly in which decisions 
on current problems are made.
It should be mentioned here that it is most significant 
that internal differences among Arab League member States 
do not affect voting in the UÎ^I General Assembly. Dis­
agreement among these States appears to be indicated 
more by abstention rather than casting votes against the 
Arab bloc.
This is due to the policy of the Arab League to 
endeavour to increase the power of the General Assembly 
at the expense of the Security C o u n c i l T h i s  policy 
could be attributed to the external influence which lead 
the Arab States to follow a common policy on issues 
regarded as vital to the group, particularly opposition
(10) Ball Margaret M ., Bloc voting in the General Assembly
International Organisations volume 5, 19 51, p.26.
(11) Ball Margaret M. Op.eit. p.27*
to Israel and the colonial powers. Under these circumstances,
the Arab League member States have actively supported and
encouraged the development of the Afro-Asian bloc at
( 1 0 )the UN which now dominates the General Assembly.' ^
The Arab League member States introduced a technique 
used in both the Security Council and the General Assembly 
which made it incumbent for any Arab delegate to act as 
temporary spokesman for the rest of the Arab States on 
issues regarded as vital to the group. The Arab League 
member States also,participate as a sub bloc at the 
regular meetings of the Afro-Asian bloc which are usually 
held during General Assembly sessions.
The Arab League intensified its interest in the 
various non-political UN organs such as the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the various ECOSOC 
agencies, and the Trusteeship Council.
It nominates qualified Arab Candidates to fill the 
vacant seat of the ICJ allocated to the M.E. in accordance 
with Article 9 of the statute which stipulates that the 
body of judges as a whole should represent the main 
forms of civilisation and the principal legal systems of 
the World.
The same procedures apply also to the seat of the 
Security Coun.cil allocated to the M.E. In this connection, 
the Arab League had attempted, during the first four 
sessions of the Security Council, to reserve the M.E. 
seat in the said organ for i t s e l f . T h e  Arab League 
member States also seek election to the General Assembly's 
Committee and the. ECOSOC and usually succeed in their 
attempts•
(12) Rafa-a Muhammed Ali Op.eit. pp.310-313*
(13) Bowett B.V/. OpoCito p.239.
(14) Ball Margaret Op.eit. p.27.
National representation on the staff of the UN 
Secretariat has also been a matter of interest to the 
Arab L e a g u e . A c c o r d i n g  to Article 101 (3) of the UN 
Charter which provides that consideration in the 
employment of the staff and in the determination of the 
conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing 
the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and 
integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance 
of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis 
as possible
It would appear that these requirements are not 
always to be realized in practice, because well-qualified 
personnel, are sometimes not available from all countries.
On account of this the Arab League adopted a policy that 
every Arab State has an equal right to representation on 
the UN Secretariat. In the meantime, Arab states which 
are unable to exercise their right may relinquish it in 
favour of another Arab State*
In 19 55 the Arab League Political Committee reviewed 
the representation of the Arab States at the UN Secretariat. 
This review showed that the Arab share of posts was in­
adequate. In the meantime, the Committee requested the 
Arab States to make attempts to secure posts in the UN 
Secretariat offices, compatible with the Arab commitments 
to the UN . Because of these endeavours the Arab share of 
posts has been increased over the years. For instance in 
1963 an Arab achieved the rank of assistant Secretary 
General for the first time.
It should be noted that neither the Arab League nor 
its member States transmitted to the UN Secretariat 
copies of treaties and agreements concluded between its 
member States.
(15) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. p.260,
(16) Brownlie Ian, Basic Documents in International Law,
The Clarendon Press, 1972 po28.
According to Article 102 of the UN Charter which 
provides that every treaty and every international 
agreement entered into by any member of the UN after 
the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as 
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published 
by it.(^^) It would appear that the UN Treaty series 
contains only the Pact of the Arab League and a con­
vention concluded between the Arab League and the 
ILO, submitted by the latter.
THE UN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE
The UN maintains offices in Cairo for four UN 
agencies, an information Center and the UN Emergency 
Force (UNEF). The Arab League has transmitted notices 
to the UN agencies from time to time, particularly during 
and after the Arab-Israeli Wars. In 1948 the Arab League 
transmitted a joint declaration to the UN Special 
Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) at Beirut, in which 
the concerned Arab States agreed to a joint representation 
of the Arab League on the commission.
Under these circumstances, the commission invited 
the Arab League to send a liaison officer to Geneva for 
the final session of the commission.
The Commanders of the UNEF realised during the Arab- 
Israeli Wars that it was expedient to include the Arab 
League in the discussion concerning the tasks of the 
UNEF, upon which they held frequent conferences with 
the League Secretary-General and other League officials.
For instance, after the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, 
the Arab League Secretary-General was in direct contact 
with the UN on the problems of the Palestinian refugees 
relief, and also succeeded to co-ordinate the activities
(17) Brownlie Ian Op.cito p.29o
(18) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. pp.250-263o
of the Arab delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions 
through which the UN is supervising the truce between 
Israel and the adjoining Arab States.
Negotiations have taken place between the UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the 
Arab League under the programme approved by the UN 
General Assembly in v/hich the League has co-operated with 
the Agency since it started functioning in May 1950.
Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General decided 
to designate the Palestine Department of the League 
Secretariat as the principal organ of the Arab League 
to deal with matters concerning the joint Arab-UNRWA 
programmes.
In 1959 the UN Secretary-General transmitted a 
proposal for settlement of the refugees problem to the 
Arab League Secretary General but after careful con­
sideration the proposal was rejected by the Arab League.
The Arab League maintained that the refugees*s assimilation 
in certain Arab countries would be against their ov/n 
interests since the UN supported the refugees’ demands 
to return to their homes in Palestine with compensation 
for damages and loss of property. This right was in­
corporated in the UN General Assembly Resolution No.194 
adopted in 1948 and subsequently re-affirmed in a number 
of the Uî^î Security Council and the General Assembly 
resolutions S
The recent approach of the UN ECOSOC to decentralized 
the activities of the UN Technical Assistance Board (UîTTAB) 
along with the UN Special Fund, and to put them under 
the supervision of the Secretariat of the Regional Economic 
Commission, made it clear that there is no Economic
(19) Farajallah Samaan Boutros, UN Peace-keeping operation, 
Société Egyptienne De Droit International, Etudes en 
Droit International, Volume II Ligue des Etats Arabes 
et Sujects, Divers, Le Caire 1970 pp.36-37.
(20) Pîiddle Eastern Affairs, Volume 4, 1953, pol5.
(21) Tomeh George, Legal State of Arab Refugees, The 
Middle East Crisis, Ocean Publication Inc. New York 
1969 ppollO-124.
Commission for the M.E. The last resort was to expand
the activities of the economic and social programmes
of the UN office in Beirut.
In 1947, the Lebanese representative proposed at
the fifth session of the ECOSOC to establish an economic
commission for the M.E. The ECOSOC set up an ad hoc
committee to study the proposal, but the outbreak of
the Palestine War in 1948 disrupted the establishment
( 23]of an economic commission for the M.E.' '
THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE SPECIALISED AGENCIES:*
Prom the beginning the Arab League continually 
endeavoured to establish close relations with the UN 
and its Specialised Agencies. Close relations are 
maintained with several Specialised Agencies such as 
UNESCO, WHO, PAO and ILO with which formal agreements 
have been concluded on regional co-ordination of 
programmes of mutual interest. "In general terms of 
these agreements are similar to those between the 
Specialised Agencies and the Organisation of American 
States, the Council of Europe and other inter-govern­
mental Organisations"
These agreements contain principles on such matters 
as mutual consultation for the co-ordination of common 
activities, they also set forth rules on mutual exchanges 
of information and documentation, representation, and
co-operation in planning and implementing regional 
( 25)programmes.' '
(22) Al-Ghanami M.T. Op.eit. pp«96-104.
(23) Macdonald R.W. Op«cit. ppo264-270.
(24) Macdonald R.W. Opocit. p«271o
(25) Yehia Abu-Baker Op«cit. pp.89-90.
Furthermore, these agreements, normally provide 
for direct contact between the Arab League Secretary- 
General and the Directors-General of the Specialised 
Agencies o In this connection, the <VHO and PAO maintain . 
regional offices in Egypt while the League’s communication 
with the ILO goes through the regional office in Istanbul 
and with the UNESCO through its headquarters in Paris.
It would appear that co-operation between the Arab 
League and the Specialised Agencies existed before the 
conclusion of the formal agreements.
CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNESCO: -
In the case of UNESCO this started in 1946 and the 
agreement of November 26th, 19 57 merely formalised already 
existing r e l a t i o n s " T h e  Arab League maintains a 
permanent representative in Paris at the UI'TESCO Headquarters 
and consultation between the Arab League Secretariat and 
the UNESCO Director General’s Office are frequent ^
UNESCO has been implemented regional activities which 
include purely Arab regional programmes in order to satisfy 
some Arab League requirements. In this connection, the 
Arab League refused any regional activity which might 
include Israel, thus the Arab States Fundamental Education 
Center near Cairo is limited to Arab League member States.
In the meantime, UNESCO co-ordinate the UNR7/A educational 
programmes among the Palestinian refugees.
CO-OPERATION WITH TEi. PnO:-
The relationship between the Arab League and the 
Pood and Àgrigulture Organisation have been developed
(26) Abu-Eaker Yehia Op.eit. p.90.
(27) Macdonald R.W. Op«cit. p«273o
on a practical basis since the two organisations 
collaborate on sponsoring regional technical conferences. 
The culmination of these relations culminated in the 
conclusion of an agreement on co-operation on May 30th, 
1960.( ^ 8)
The PAG has frequently used Arab League expert on 
a loan basis. Por instance, the PAO used an Arab League 
desert-locust expert to supervise the anti-locust 
programme of the PAO in Saudi Arabia.^Reciprocally, 
the League provided the PAO with the facilities of its 
social service center in Yemen in carrying out its 
agricultural programme.
The Arab League PAO agreement contains provisions 
on such matters as mutual consultation for the co­
ordination of common activities. It also sets forth 
rules forwyoint activities to be reached in the near 
future, such as improvement in nutrition, conservation 
of plants and animal resources, increasing agricultural 
facilities and improved marketing and distribution net­
works for agricultural products. The argument also 
provides for mutual exchanges of information, documentation 
and representation.
The PAO maintains a regional office in Cairo through 
which the Arab League communicates with the PAO on co­
ordination of joint activities. Por instance, the PAO's 
regional office in Cairo, sponsored a training seminar 
on agricultural planting at Cairo, a seminar on food 
consumption in the Arab World at Beirut and convened a 
committee on agricultural statistics for the region at 
Amman S
(28) Abu-Baker Yehia Op.cito po90.
(29) Middle Eastern Affairs Volume , 19 53 p.104.
(30) Macdonald R.W. Opocito ppo274-275«
GO-OPERiVriQH WITH IL O ; -
The relationship between the Arab League and
the International Labour Organisation has also been
developed at a working level. The agreement of May 26th
1958 between the two organisations merely formalised
(31]already existing relations.' The Arab League - ILO 
agreement provides for mutual consultations for the 
co-ordination of joint activities. In addition it sets 
forth rules on mutual exchanges of information, 
documentation and representation.
The ILO maintains a branch office in Cairo through 
which the League Secretariat communicates with the 
Geneva office on co-ordination of joint activities.
Por example, the ILO provided half of the fund for 
the Arab League projects of translating all International 
conventions into Arabic concluded within the framework 
of the ILO. It also provides technical assistance for 
the Arab League member States, particularly in
(32]Labour problems.'^ ' In this connection, the ILO recognised 
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Union as a
( 3 3 ]regional Labour Organisation.'^ '
CO-OPERivTIOH WITH THE WHO; -
The relationship between the World Health Organ­
isation and the Arab League has also been developed on 
a practical foundation. Since 1950.annual health 
conference for the Eastern Mediterranean area are 
organised jointly. The Agreement-of August 22nd, 1961
(31) Abu-Eaker Yehia Op.cito po90o 
(.32) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. pp*275-276.
(33) El-Ashmawy Abdul V/aha'b, the Arab Labour Organisation 
Initiation, Aims, Macninery, Egyptian Political 
Science Review, Special Issue on the Arab League, 
Cairo, March 1972* pp*60-61.
between the two organisations merely sets forth already 
existing relations /
The WHO and the Arab League agreement sets forth 
principles on matters such as consultations for the 
co-ordination of common activities. The agreements also 
provides for co-operation in all matters that arise in 
the field of health. In addition it sets forth procedures 
on mutual exchanges of non-voting representatives on 
health conferences organised by either organisations 
and of documentation and information.
The WHO maintains a regional office in Alexandria 
through which the Arab League has been communicating 
with the Headquarters of the WHO since 19 50, co­
ordinating programmes on health and on technical co­
operation .^ and dealing with problems of mutual interest.
In addition to these UN Specialised Agencies, 
there are several UN Agencies with which the Arab League 
has no formal agreements, although they are carrying 
out regional programmes.
The World Bank extended valuable assistance to 
the Arab League in drawing up the Chari:er for the Arab 
Development Bank in 1956«
The World Meteorological organisation (v/IvîO) organised 
a comprehensive study of climatology in the Near East 
in 1962.
International Civil Aviation Organisation (iCAO) 
has organised a number of regional seminars in the 
Arab World on matters such as air traffic, control, 
aeronautical communications and weather forecasting.
The ICAO established in 1965 a Civil Aviation Plight 
Safety Center in Beirut as a training Center for students 
from the Near East and Africa. The project was funded
(34) Abu-Baker Yehia Op.cito p «90.
(35) Macdonald R.W. Op.eit. p.276.
by the ICAO, the UN Special Pund and the Arab League.
The International Atomic Energy Agency established 
in 1962 a Regional Isotope Training Center in Cairo 
as a training Center for students from the Arab World.
The project was financed jointly by the IAEA the 
Arab League and the UN technical Assistance programmes
The Arab League has maintained close co-operation 
with the UN and its Specialised Agencies to co-ordinate 
its activities within the framev/ork of the World 
Organisation to accomplish its objectives. That goes far 
beyond the agreements with the above-mentioned agencies 
in which the Arab League Secretary General recommended 
the Arab League member States to adopt a common policy 
on representation to all the UN Specialised Agencies, 
and the establishment of joint Arab Offices at the 
Headquarters of these Agencies.
The Arab League member States who seek nomination 
for executive posts in the governing bodies of most of 
the UN Specialised Agencies usually succeeded in their 
attempts. In recent years, the Arab League convened 
special conferences of Arab experts in order to unify 
the Arab policy in advance of important conferences 
of the UN Specialised Agencies.
The Arab League has been successful in its relations 
with the UN. Specialised Agencies, but much remains to 
be done to ensure Arab co-operations for the achievement 
of freedom, secuimty and progress.
(,36) Al-Ghanami M.T. Op.eit. pp .1072-1074
(37) Macdonald R.7. Op.eit « ppo277-278.
OO-OPii^RATIQH WITH THE QAU;.-
"The Arab League in its struggles against Zionism 
and the Organisation of African Unity in its struggle 
against the remnants of white power in Rhodesia and 
South Africa have never justified their acts by 
references to their status as regional agencies. They 
have argued in terms of self-defence and the right to • 
use force to protect their kith and kin and to eliminate 
colonialism"
Nearly half of the members of the Arab League are 
also at the same time members of the OAU in which the 
Afro-Arab relationship are expressed in both the charter 
of the OAU and the Pact of the Arab League. The strongest 
voices for black African interests within the Arab 
League ar^ those member States wbo are also members 
of the OAU e.g. Somalia, Sudan and Algeria which long 
ago proposed to establish special links between the 
Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity.
In practice, relations between the Arab League 
and the OAU have been developed at a v^orking level over 
the years since the establishment of the OAU in May 1963. 
Under these circumstances, the Arab League extended an 
invitation to the Secretary-General of the OAU from its 
earlier days to attend the meeting of the League Council.
Prom the beginning, the League Secretary-General 
decided to designate the African Department of the League 
Secretariat as the principal organ of the Arab League 
to deal with matters concerning African States. Subsequently 
the League Secretary-General decided to establish a 
liaison staff at the Headquarters of the OAU in Addis 
Ababa to be supervised by the African Denartment of 
the League Secretariat.
(37) Akehurst Michael Op.cit. p.182.
(38) Mazrui All A. Slack Africa and the Arabs, foreign
Affairs, volume 53 No.4 July 1975, p*740*
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One of the major tasks of the Arab League is to 
collaborate with international organisations which may 
be established in the future to guarantee peace and 
security and organise economic and social relations.
The Arab League has endeavoured since its establishment 
to promote close co-operation with iiie African countries 
and has supported the African independence movement.
further co-operation between the OAU and the Arab 
League is covêred by resolutions of the two organisations 
for joint action at the UN. The major result of this is 
the existence of a voting bloc in the UN General 
Assembly.
On the other hand, the African countries have 
supported the Arab countries on various occasions, 
starting with the African states’ initiative in breaking 
off relations with Israel aft'er the War of 1973, and 
recognising and supporting the Arabs in their struggles 
to regain their occupied territories and restore the 
rights of the Palestinian peoples.
Under these circumstances, the Sixth Arab Summit 
Conference in Algeria in November 1973 decided to 
extend immediate assistance to the African countries to 
alleviate the economic difficulties resulting from the 
oil embargo imposed by the Arab League on all exports 
of oil to South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.
The OAU established a committee to study and assess 
the unintended consequences of the Arab oil embargo and 
of the nev/ oil prices on the economies of the African 
States. The Committee met in 1974 with the Arab League 
representatives at which it was assumed of unlimited 
supplies of oil to the African States, but it did not 
obtain special concessions on prices.
In principle, the Arabs planned to exhend assistance 
to the African States initially by establishing a special
Arab Bank with an initial capital of ^200 million for 
African development to be used for development projects
At the Seventh Arab Summit Conference in Rabat in 
October 1974, Somalia forwarded the idea of preparing 
the first Arab-African Summit Conference of the heads 
of States. The proposal was approved by the Council of 
the Heads of Arab States at its seventh meeting in Rabat 
in October 1974, and preparations are under v/ay to bring 
together more than 60 Heads of States. The Council also 
adopted the resolution of October 1974 which laid down 
the basic principles for unlimited co-operation between 
the Arab World and the African countries. The first 
Arab-African summit conference of the Heads of State 
was not called for a specific issue but uniquely for 
laying down a pattern of long term co-operation on 
substantial matters.
The OAU Ministerial Council held a meeting in 
February 1975 which decided to set up a committee of 
twelve members, three of whom are Afro-Arab countries, 
Egypt, Sudan and Algeria. The committee is entrusted with 
a task to prepare for the Arab-African summit conference 
in conjunction with a similar committee of twleve members 
of the Arab League established by the League Council 
for the same purpose.
The OAU Committee and the Arab League Committee 
held a number of meetings throughout 19,75 at both 
Ambassadorial and Ministerial levels in order to draw 
up a mutual programme of action for Afro-Arab co­
operation. The Afro-Arab committees held a meeting in 
Dakar Senegal in April 1976 at Foreign Ministerial 
level at which they approved a declaration of principles 
and a working programme for the Afro-Arab Co-operation 
which should be submitted to the first joint summit 
conference.
(39) Mazrui All A. Op.cit. pp.740-741*
"...The two sides pledged themselves to respect 
the sovereignty territorial integrity and political 
independence of all States re-affirmed their adherence 
to the non-aligned policy and condemned Imperialism and 
Zionism and all forms of racism and religious dis­
crimination, especially in Africa, Palestine and the 
occupied territories.
In the field of economics the Arab-African Porpign 
Ministers pledged themselves to pursue further co-operation 
in*trade, mining, communication,telecommunications and the 
establishment of direct trade relations to meet the needs 
of Arab African markets and the preferential treatment 
of each other. The two sides also undertook to co­
operate in exploiting the huge natirral resources of the 
Arab-African countries, encouraging investment projects, 
promoting technical, financial co-operation, and laying 
down conditions for the establishment of joint ventures 
and the provisions of loans. The Secretariat General 
of the OAU and the Arab League were entrusted with pre­
paring a detailed study for the implementation of the 
above-mentioned programmes. The said study was to be 
submitted to the next meeting of the Arab-African 
committees at their Foreign Ministerial level Conference 
It would appear that the real challenge is re­
presented by the fact that both the Arab and African 
countries are belonging to the newly independent Third 
World States which lack technological knowhow.
The Arab League called for the Arab States to extend 
urgent and immediate assistance to African countries without 
waiting for the establishment of the Arab development 
bank for Africa with an initial capital of ^200 million.
(4-0) Pamphlet "The Arab League in Today’s World" prepared
for the Arab League by "The Middle East" 63 Long Acre, 
London, 1976, p.4*
(41) pamphlet Op.cit. p.4.
An urgent meeting of the Arab Oil Ministers with 
the OAU Committee took place at the Headquarters of the 
Arab League in Cairo in January 1974 on how to expedite 
aids to the African countries. It was agreed to organise 
the Arab Development Dank for Africa on the basis of 
making loans at a nominal one per cent interest rate with 
a ten year period of grace available. The Bank was due 
to be operating in the second half of 1976, once the 
African countries begin to receive the aid allotted to 
them in two equal installments, and by the end of 1976 
more than ^185 million were distributedo^
At the Summit Conference of the Heads of States of 
the Organisation of African Unity, which took place in 
Khartoum in July 1978, several Heads of States expressed 
satisfaction at the improved relations between the 
Arab League and the OAU since 1973* The representatives 
of the Arab League, the PLO and the Arab Development 
Bank for Africa attended the summit conference with non­
voting representation.
The current OAU Chairman was the Sudan’s President 
who was also the current Chairman of the Arab League.
Sudan is always seen as the link between the Arab World 
and the Black African countries.
The Summit Conference of the Heads of States of the 
OAU adopted six resolutions directly concerning the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and furthering Arab-African co-operation,
A resolution was unanimously adopted, supporting the Arab 
confrontation States in their peaceful efforts to regain 
the occupied territories, and the Palestinian people in 
their legitimate struggle to restore their rights and 
condemning the unholy alliance between the Zionist and 
South African regimes. "A separate resolution requested 
the Arab League to grant observer status to African 
Liberation Movements, such as, the African National Council
(42) Pamphlet Op.cit. p.3.
(ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the South- 
West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO)
The problem of Western Sahara remains a sensitive 
issue for the OAU and the Arab League in which previous 
Arab League attempts to settle the conflict were un­
successful to persuade Morocco to drop objections to 
the issue being discussed*
The Summit Conference of the Heads of State of the 
OAU decided to establish an ad hoc committee of five 
Heads of State which was assigned to study the situation 
of the Western Sahara on the .spot, with a view to bringing 
about a peaceful settlement based on the right of the 
Saharawi people to self-determination•
The situation in the Horn of Africa is of importance 
to the Arab League and the OAU, Somalia being a member of 
both organisations, while Ethiopia is only a member of 
the OAU. However, the efforts of the Heads of State of 
the OAU at the Summit failed to draw the parties even a 
little closer to a mutually acceptable solution. There 
are a number of basic differences between Somalia and 
Ethiopia in addition to the implication over the foreign 
intervention in the area. Despite that the Summit decided 
to continue the work of the OAU mediation Committee. The 
President of Guinea proposing the establishment a peace­
keeping force of the OAU to be stationed on the borders 
between Somalia and Ethiopia to which the former agreed, 
whilst the latter did not.^^^^
The Arab League approach of co-operation with the 
OAU is a step forward towards further collaboration with 
the existing international organisations aimed at the 
achievement of the objectives of the League. The Arab 
League can be given credit for the realisation of the 
importance of economic and political co-operation 
with the African countries.
(.43) The Middle East, September No. , 1978 p.12.
(44) The Middle East No.47, September 1978.
CO-OPERATION V/ITH THE EEC; -
A declaration was made by the European Economic 
Community member states in November 1973, shortly 
after the October war, on the inadmissibility of 
acquiring territory by force, calling for Israel to 
withdraw from the Arab occupied territories, recognising 
the right of all States in the region, including Israel 
to live in peace within secure and recognised borders 
and the right of Palestinian people to determine their 
national identity. This initiative encouraged the Arabs 
to call for a dialogue between the EEC member States 
and the Arab League member States with the objective to 
prepare the way for political, economic, industrial, 
agricultural and cultural co-operation.^
The first dialogue conference between the EEC and 
the Arab League member States, took place in Cairo in
1975. At this conference it was agreed in principle to 
co-operate on economic, financial and technical matters.
The second Conference took place in Rome, and the third 
in Abu-Dhabi. The agenda of these conferences were confined 
to matters mentioned at the first conference in Cairo, 
but the conference in Abu-Dhabi and Rome emphasised co­
operation in scientific, technical, vocational training, 
marketing, agricultural matters in addition to the transfer 
the Western technology and equipment to the Arab ,Vorid.
The fourth dialogue conference between the Arab 
League and the EEC member States took place in Luxembourg. 
Here the dialogue focussed on political matters, but it 
deadlocked over EEC recognition of the PLO as a legitimate 
and sole representative of the Palestinian people and 
the putting of pressure on Israel to withdraw from the 
occupied Arab territories.
(45) Pamphlet Op.cit. p.l.
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The joint communique after the fourth Conference 
called for a peaceful settlement to the Arab Israeli 
conflict based on the recognition of the right of the 
Palestinian people to determine their national identity 
as essential for a lasting peaceful settlement.
It was agreed at the Luxembourg dialogue to establish 
a General Commission at Ambassadorial level to meet twice 
a year in Arab and European Capitals alternately.
■ It was also agreed that the two sides v/ould be 
represented by a single delegation each. It was agreed 
that the Commission would be the supreme organ of the 
European Economic Community and the Arab League dialogue, 
dealing v/ith political issues*
The Conference also set up a General Committee con­
sisting of Foreign Ministers of the two sides, and at the 
meeting of bhis Committee countries were to be named and 
thus the EEC members would deal with the PLO as a political 
body representing a people.
It would appear that the EEC member States hesitated 
to co-operate over the Foreign Ministerial meetings*
This is one of the many difficulties to be overcome before 
the next romid of scheduled meeting is resumed, planned to 
take place in Tunisia* It would appear that the EEC members 
are still not prepared to recognise the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation as the legitimate and sole representative of 
the Palestinian people becaue they are concerned about 
their relations with Israel*
A preparatory meeting for the fifth dialogue Conference 
scheduled to take place in Tunisia, was held in Damascus 
between EEC an.d Arab League senior officials to find an 
acceptable compromise to the PLO's representation in 
the dialogue. It was however, a step forward that the
(.46) Pamplilot Op.cit. pp.5-6.
EEC member States spelled out in more specific terms than 
before that a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict can be achieved only once a solution to the 
Palestinian question has been found. They also made it 
clear that Israeli settlements on the occupied Arab 
territories constitute an obstacle to any move toward 
lasting peaceful settlement.
The main achievement of the Damascus meeting was to 
attain some progress on economic and commercial issues 
and the decision to establish the Euro-Arab Centre for 
the transfer of technology which would be set in an 
Arab Capital. It was also agreed to co-operate in all 
matters that arise in the field of agricultural, agro­
industrial and financial investment, including measures 
to protect foreign investments^
This is also a step forward towards closer co-operation 
with the EEC, and will have great impact in the near 
future. The new approach of the Arab League of co-operation 
with the existing international organisations seems to 
have proved to be very successful.
(47) Middle East Events No*60, January 1979*
CONCLUSION;.-
The most significant feature in the establishment 
of the Arab League was the attempt to bind all Arab 
countries and direct them to strive toward the welfare 
of the Arab World, to improve its conditions, ensure its 
future, and realize its hopes and aspirations.
The Arab League is composed of the independent Arab 
States, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which 
though not a sovereign State has full membership owing 
to the special situation and therefore its representative 
participates in all meetings at any level.
Despite good intentions, some members abused their 
rights by raising obstacles to the admission of new 
members. Actions consequent upon the apparently expansionist 
policy of Morocco towards its neighbours could probably 
be cited as instances of such obstructionist attitude 
and disregard of the spirit and the letter of the Pact 
of the Arab League. The delay in the admission of Mauretania 
to membership was due to Moroccan objections, the failure 
of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara to exercise their 
right to self-determination could possibly be traced to 
Morocco-Hauretanian occupation of that territory.
Another instance of breach of the provisions of the 
Pact of the Arab League could probably be perceived in 
the handling of the incident of June 1978 between North 
and Southern Yemen. Here the Government of North Yemen 
requested an emergency meeting of the League Council 
but according to Article 11 of the Pact of the Arab League, 
the Council meets in ordinary session twice a year, and 
may only be convened in extra-ordinary session at the 
request of two member States.
In the above mentioned incident the extra-ordinary 
session convened at the request of one member State only.
(khe Government of North. Yemen.) and not as provided by 
the Pact at the request of two member States. It is, 
however, clear that in order to prevent a confrontation 
within the League the implementation of the decision 
arrived at that session was declared discretionary and 
optional•
Another case for legitimate criticism is the require­
ment of unanimity. It could be argued that a two-thirds 
majority requirement for making decisions binding on 
the members would mal-ce for greater efficiency of the 
League. A shift from the requirement of an unanimous 
vote to the requirement of a two-thirds majority vote 
will strengthen the organisation although, it would 
appear that the real problem is the reluctance of member 
States to carry out any decisions that impinge on their 
sovereignty. An Amendment to the Pact would be required, 
particularly. Article 5, which limits the jurisdiction 
of the League Council to disputes which do not concern 
a State’s independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Conceivably, the Pact would be strengthened 
by the inclusion of supra-national compulsory arbitration 
of disputes between member States, the establishment of 
an Arab Court of Justice, supra-national sovereign assembly 
and a peace-keeping force based on the same principle.
One could argue that the League does not suffer from 
structure weakness, but from the inability and perhaps 
unwillingness of its member States to co-operate con­
sistently putting common interests before apparently 
national ones.
In consequence of the proposed diversion of the 
tributaries of the Jordan River by Israel in 1963,, the 
Heads of Arab States held their first meeting in 1964 
in Alexandria and agreed to reconvene annually every 
September, This decision faced the observer with a
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new quasi-organ of the League whose meetings cannot 
be considered a meeting of the League Council at the 
level of Heads of State within the terms of the Pact.
This new organ of the Arab League has annual metings 
distinct from the meetings of the League Council. They 
are held annually in September, while the meetings of 
the League Council are held bi-annually in March and 
October. One could assert with some justification that 
this constitutes a unanimously established fait accompli 
implying an amendment of the Pact and the establishment 
of a new organ superior to the League Council in competence 
and authority.
Another criticism, frequently voiced deals with the 
fact that most institutions and agencies are situated in 
Cairo, instead of being distribtued equitably in the 
Capitals of the member States.
A current complaint by the other Arab countries is 
that the Egyptian staff is out of proportion to the 
numerical and political importance of Egypt and its 
commitments to the Arab League. It would appear that 
the posts of the Secretary-General and the Assistant 
Secretary-General for military affairs are reserved from 
the early days of the Arab League for the Egyptians.
Three successive Secretaries-General were Egyptian, 
and it is now demanded that nomination for these posts 
should be open to all member States. In the early days 
of the Arab League the Egyptians paid the largest share 
of the contribution to the League and the reservation of 
the above mentioned posts to Egyptians was a direct 
result. By now, however, many member States pay larger 
contributions than the Egyptians•
The Arab League is recognised by the UN as a 
regional organisation and as a collective self-defence 
arrangement, under Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter.
The Arab Collective Security Pact was concluded in 1950 
between the original members of the League.
Its provisions excluded non-signatories from particip­
ation in the running of all those institutions which 
arose as a direct consequence of the conclusion of the 
Pact, thus limiting the efficacy of the Pact, as the nev/ 
members of the League only adhered to it in 1961.
As a possible result the Pact failed in its objectives 
during the Anglo-Prance attacks on the Suez Canal zone, 
and the Israeli campaign in the Sinai.As is well known 
the signatories of the Pact completely failed to carry 
out their obligations under Article 2, 4 and Section 
5 of the Military Annex, refraining from any collective 
action to repel the aggression against one of its 
contracting members Egypt *
In all subsequent armed hostilities between the 
Arab Front States and Israel, participation of the League 
member States was each time on an individual basis and 
not due to the invocation of the collective Self- 
defence Pact#
The Pact was invoked for the first time in its 
history in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute which allowed the 
League to intervene in this dispute.
While the January 1964 Summit of the Heads of Arab 
States, approved of the establishment of a Joint Arab 
Command under an Egyptian General, there also seemed 
little likelihood that any member State would ever 
permit the establishment, and stationing of a permanent 
Joint Arab Command force of any importance on its 
territory. The Pact did not establish any institutionalised 
mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
In practice, disputes between member States have 
been handled by the traditional methods of arbitration, 
conciliation, mediation and good office by the Secretary- 
General. The League's approach to inter-Arab disputes 
always favours conciliation between member States rather 
than adjudication which could be considered a possible 
weakness. A case in point is the League's mediatory role 
in the Lebanese Civil war which failed as a result of 
the existing differences among Arab League member States.
In another case the League failed to preserve the in­
dependence and the territorial integrity of the Western 
Sahara and even its attempts to persuade Morocco to 
drop objections to the issue being discussed were un­
successful. In the Kuwait-Iraq dispute of 1961 the 
Arab League scored a success rejecting Iraq’s territorial 
claims upon Kuwait and adopting effective measures for 
the preservation of Kuv/ait’s independence and territorial 
integrity.
In all disputes involving member and non-members 
the League’s intervention was always based on procedures 
of a regional system reaching against an external threat 
rather than a regional procedures for the peaceful 
settlement of internal disputes.. As has been mentioned before 
the League's endeavours to prevent the establishment of 
a Jewish State in Palestine failed. It also failed sub­
sequently to act decisively with regard to boundary 
disputes affecting its members in their various clashes 
with Israel. Indeed on almost all occasions, e.g. 194-8,
1956, 1967 and 1973 Israel either temporarily or permanently 
expanded its territory at the expense of its Arab neighbours.
As has been mentioned above the economic activities 
of the Arab League would appear to have created unnecessary 
duplication of competence of various institutions and
authorities, thus disrupting economic development programmes. 
It is probable that modelling of the economic activities 
of the Arab League on integrative institutes similar to 
those of the European Economic Community would obviate 
the need for the existence of the manifold separate 
development projects.
Some sort of Arab Common Market could play a, role 
similar to that of the European Economic Community, and 
could well devote the necessary attention to the 
improvement of methods of technical, agricultural, 
economic and financial development.
Arab League activities in the social and cultural 
fields are ruled by the November 1945 Treaty. But sub­
sequent Charter and Statute detailing these activities 
were only ratified by a limited number of Arab States. 
Therefore it would seem most social and cultural activities 
have been either abandoned or pigeonholed for lack of 
co-operation between member States, who on the other 
hand have accused the League of inadequacy in the 
implementation of these activities.
It would also be fair to describe the efforts in 
the technical and scientific as hampered by inter-state 
rivalry. Nevertheless, some notable achievements were 
gained in these fields despite conflicts and rivalry, 
for which the Arab League can claim full credit.
Much more success has been gained in the field of 
promoting Arab independence. Since 1945 the number of 
independent Arab States has risen from seven to twenty 
one. There is still the problem of the setting up of an 
independent Western Sahara State and of a Palestine State 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both of which it is 
hoped will take their seats in the Arab League Council 
in the near future*
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The Arab League's co-operation with the UN started 
with the League's approach at the UN Conference at San 
Francisco in 1945 and since 1951, the Secretary-General 
of the Arab League has been a regular and official 
observer at the UN General Assembly sessions.
The Arab League has endeavoured to co-ordinate its 
activities with the framework of the UN to accomplish its 
activities. These endeavours culminated in the successful 
introduction of Arabic as an official language of the 
UN and a number of its Specialised Agencies. In the 
meantime, the Arab League continuously endeavours to 
establish close relations with the UN Specialised Agencies
The same approach is exercised in attempting to 
establish co-operation with the Organisation of African 
Unity and European Economic Community as an integral 
part of the policy toward further co-operation with 
existing international organisations.
The Pact of the Arab League was drafted more than 
thirty years ago, and has never been amended officially, 
since then with the exception of a minor amendment re­
lating to the dates of meeting of the League Council.
Under the circumstances mentioned above a revision of 
the Pact of the Arab League and the 19 50 Arab Collective 
Security Pact would appear timely in order to reflect 
the many changes that have taken place over the years 
within the League's system as well as in the international 




(1) Akehurst, Michael, Enforcement Action by Regional
Agencies, with Special Reference to the 
Organisation of American States, B.Y.B.I.L.,
Oxford University Press, London, 1967,
Volume 4-2 o
(2) Alexandria Protocol, The, Published by the Arab
League, Cairo, N.B.
C,3) Arab League, Directorate of Information of the,
The League of Arab States, Objectives and 
Implementation (Arabic text) Cairo, N.D.
(4) Arab League, The, in To-day's World, The Pamphlet
prepared for the Arab League by the Middle East 
63 Long Acre, London, 1976.
(5) Ashmawy, El,Abdul Wahab, the Arab Labour Organisation,
Initiation, Aims, Machinery, Egyptian Political 
Science Review Special Issue on the Arab League,
Cairo, March 1972*
(6) Assad, El-, Nasser-ed-Din, The Arab Cultural Integrity,
Egyptian Political Science Review Special Issue 
on the Arab League Cairo, March 1972.
(7) Atiyah, E ., The Arabs, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, 1955.
(8) Auda, Abdul-Putuh Earned, The Arab League System,
Egyptian Political Science Review, Special Issue 
on the Arab League, Cairo 1972*
(9) Ball, Margaret M. Bloc Voting in the General Assembly,
International Organisation, Volume 5, 1951*
■133“
(10) Banna Al-, Abdul Monam, The Arab Economic Unity
Egyptian Political Science Review, Special 
Issue on the Arab League Cairo, March 1R72.
(11) Bergue, !.. The Arabs, Faber & Faber, London 1964.
(12) Bowett, B.y. The Law of International Institutions,
Stevens & Sons, London 1976.
(13) Brownlie, Ian, Basic Documents in International Law,
Clarendon Press 1972.
(14) Brownlie, Ian, Principles of International Law,
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1973*
(15) Bullard, Reader, The Middle East, Oxford University
Press, London 1958.
(16) Emary El-, Ahmed Saleem, The Essence of the Arab
People and the Arab League, the Egyptian Political 
Science Review, Special Issue on the Arab League, 
Cairo March 1972.
(17) Farajallah, Sama-an Boutros, UN Peace-keeping
Operation, Société Egyptiens De Droit International 
Etudes on Droit International, Volume 11, Ligue 
des Etuds Arabes et Sujects Divers Le Caire 1970.
(18) Gerhard, Bebr, Regional Organisations, A UN Problem,
A.J.I.L. Volume 49, Washington 1955.
(19) Ghanami, A1,-M.T., The United Nations and the Specialised
Agencies, Atlas Press, Cairo, Volume 2 1974 
(Arabie Text).
(20) Goma-a, Ahamed M., The foundation of the League of
Arab States, Longman Groups Ltd., London 1977*
(21) Grant, J.P., Oil and Gas Law, University of Dundee,
1975.
(22) Greig, D.W. International Law, Butterworths London
1976.
-Lj4“
(23) Hammond, Y.P. & Alexander S.S., Political Dynamic
in The Middle East, American Elsevier, Publishing 
Company, New York 1972.
(.24) Hassouna, H ., The League of the Arab States and
Regional Disputes, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation 
Cambridge University 1969*
(25) Hitti, P.M., The History of the Arabs, Macmillan & Co.
Ltd., London 1964*
(26) Hudson, Michael C ., The Palestinian Factor in the
Lebanese Civil War, Middle East, Journal, Summer 
Volume 32, Washington 1978.
(27) Hussonna, Hussein A ., The League of Arab States and
Regional Disputes, Ooean Publication Inc.,
New York 1975*
(.28) International Court of Justice, Report No *2., 1975.
(29) International Organisations, Volume 1, Boston 1947*
(30) Jalangir, Amuzegar, The Ideology and Economic Grov/th
in the*Middle East, The Middle East Journal,
Volume 28, 1974.
(31) Khadduri, M., The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement,
A.J.I.L. Volume 40, 1946.
(32) Khalidi, Walid, Thinking the Unthinkable, A sovereign
Palestinian State, Foreign Affairs, Volume 56,
No.4, New York 1978.
(33) Latham, Edward, Crisis in the Middle East, the H.W.
Wilson Company, New York 1952.
(34) Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs,
Cornell University Press, New York, 1962.
(35) Macdonald, R.W. The League of Arab States, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965o
-135'
(36) Mazrui, Ali A., Black Africa and Arabs, Foreign
Affairs, Volume 53 No.4 July 1975*
(37). Monroe, Elizabeth, Kuwait and Aden a contrast in
British Policies, the Middle East, Journal 
Volume 18, 1964*
(3 8 ) Moore, J.N. The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume 3,
Documents, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey 1974*
(v39) Moussa, Ahmed, En Marge du Membership dans la 
Ligue Arabe (en arabe) : Société Egyptiene 
Droit International Etuds en Droit International, 
Volume 11, Cairo 1970 (Arabie Text) .
(40) Refa-a, Muliammed Ali, The Arab League and Liberation
Matters, the Egyptian Company for Pressing and 
Publication, Cairo May 1971 (Arabic Text) •
(41) Rostow, Eugene, The Illegality of the Arab Attack
on Israel of October 6th, 1973, A.J.I.L. Volume 
69, 1975.
(42) Sami, Abdul Hamid Muhammed, International Regional
Organisations, Alexandria University Press 
Alexandria 1971 (Arabic Text).
C43) Sayegh, Payez A.. Arab Unity Hope and Fulfillment,
The Devin-Adair Company, New York 1958.
(44) Seabur-y, Pa,ul, The League of Arab States, Debacle
of a Regional Arrangement, International 
Organisations Volume 19, 1949*
(45) Seton^William, M.U. Britain and The Arab States
Luzac and Company Ltd., London 1948.
U  jD-
(^46) Stoaices, Prank, The Civil War in Lebanon, the 
Wor3.d Today, the Broadwater Press, Welwyn:
Garden City, Hertfordshire, Volume 32, 1976.
(47) Tahar, Alyliamdi, The Lebanon's Political System,
the Universal Press, Cairo 1976 (Arabic Text).
(48), Thomas, M. Prank, The Stealing of the Sahara
A.J.I.L, Volume 70, 1976*
(49). Tomeh, George, Legal Status of Arab Refugees
the Middle East Crisis, Ocean Publication 
InCf, New York 1969o
(,50) Turck, Nancy, The Arab Boycott of Israel, Poreign 
Affairs, Volume 55 No.l Washington 1976*
(51) Turner, Louis and Bedore, James, Saudi Arabia the
Power of the Purse-string, International Affairs 
Volume No,54, Oxford University Press, London
1978.
(52) Yehia, Abu-Baku, The Mission of Information in
Common Arab Action, Egyptian Political Science 














Guardian, The, Tuesday, January 9th, 1979* 
Middle East, The, September 1978, No.47*
Middle East Events, September 8th, 1978, No.51* 
Middle East Events, November 7th, 1978, No.56. 
Middle East Events, December 15th, 1978, No*58. 
Middle East Events, December 29th, 1978, No*59. 
Middle East Events, January 12th, 1979, No.60. 
Middle Eastern Affairs, Volume 4, 19 53* 
Observer, The, 24th December 1978.
Saudi Gazette No*675, Sunday July 2nd, 1978*
j GLAR
